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ABSTRACT
BETTY T. TAO: The Impact of Health Insurance on Medical Care,
Lifestyle Behaviors and Health of Non-Elderly Diabetics
(Under the direction of Donna B. Gilleskie)
This dissertation examines the impact of health insurance coverage on diabetics’
decisions to monitor, treat and manage their condition and gauges the effect of these
decisions on their health. Diabetics can experience serious or fatal complications with-
out regular monitoring (of blood glucose and other indicators of disease severity) and,
in some cases, prescription medication. These activities can present a significant fi-
nancial burden that could be substantially attenuated by health insurance. Through
cross-price effects, insurance may also influence important lifestyle choices such as ex-
ercise and diet. However, insurance status is likely to be determined simultaneously
with these behaviors in shaping health. Using a sample of non-elderly diabetics from
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey, I jointly estimate demand equations for health
insurance, medical treatment, lifestyle decisions and health, controlling for their com-
mon unobserved determinants. I find that insurance with drug coverage leads to better
adherence to diabetic care guidelines. Furthermore, the presence of insurance lowers
the probability of eye and kidney problems. I estimate that individuals value the for-
mer at over $40,000. There is, however, some evidence of ex ante moral hazard: those
covered by insurance with a drug plan show slightly lower probabilities of exercising
regularly. I also use alternate model specifications to test the robustness of results.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Over 20 million people in the United States suffer from diabetes mellitus and the
number is projected to increase rapidly, as an estimated 41 million Americans are pre-
diabetic.1 Diabetics produce either low levels of insulin or insulin that cannot regulate
blood sugars. The resulting higher levels of blood glucose can compromise a wide
range of body tissues and organs. For example, diabetes is the leading cause of adult
blindness, kidney failure and amputations.
Type 2 diabetes, which accounts for over 90 percent of diabetes cases, requires
ongoing medical attention both to limit complications and to manage them when they
do occur. Diabetes care guidelines mandate regular measurement of blood glucose
levels, foot and eye examinations and regular checkups, all of which can become quite
costly. Furthermore, over 60 percent of diabetics require oral medications to lower
blood sugar levels and many need additional medicines to help control cholesterol and
1According to the CDC’s “National Diabetes Fact Sheet,” 14.6 million people have been diagnosed
with diabetes while 6.2 million are unaware they have it. Pre-diabetics face an elevated risk of type 2
diabetes, heart disease and stroke. They have higher than normal levels of blood glucose, but are still
below the diabetes threshold.
blood pressure.2 As a result, they experience much higher health expenditures than the
general population. For instance, in 2002 total per capita medical care expenditures
were $13,243 for diabetics and $2,560 for non-diabetics (American Diabetes Association
2002). Successful management also requires lifestyle changes, such as exercise and
improved nutrition, that may delay or even completely prevent diabetes complications.3
However, these can be costly as well.
Adherence to these guidelines has important implications for the course of the dis-
ease. Detection and treatment of diabetic eye disease can reduce severe vision loss by
an estimated 50 to 60 percent, while controlling blood pressure limits the decline in
kidney function by 30 to 70 percent. Comprehensive foot care programs can reduce
amputation rates by 45 to 85 percent. Indeed, these interventions could ultimately
be cost saving. Diabetes management programs such as the Asheville Project and the
more recent Diabetes Ten City Challenge enlist employers to actively encourage their
workers to care for their diabetes by providing regular exposure to trained pharmacists
and waiving co-payments on medication and monitoring supplies. Although total med-
ical costs increased initially, they fell in subsequent years and job absenteeism was cut
by 50 percent.
Health insurance lowers the out-of-pocket price of medical care and in the process,
possibly influences lifestyle choices via cross-price effects. For example, some may
use more medical care when insured, but devote fewer resources to exercising and
preparing healthy foods, dampening any positive effects of insurance on health. This
2This figure is compiled by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) using data from
the National Health Interview Survey in 2005. Those with type 1 and more severe cases of type 2
diabetes require insulin.
3Even for people already diagnosed with diabetes type 2, weight loss may make insulin more effective
in bringing down blood sugar. Regular exercise and choosing foods that are more slowly digested and
thus do not cause a large spike in blood sugar after eating help control blood sugar levels. A good
diet and regular exercise also help to lower high blood pressure, which commonly increases the risk of
diabetic eye and kidney damage.
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paper examines the role of insurance in determining the medical care consumption,
health behaviors and health of non-elderly diabetic adults. I focus on the non-elderly
since over three-fourths of diabetics age 18 through 79 are diagnosed before age 60
and half are diagnosed between 40 and 59 (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
2004). Their decisions will have a substantial impact on the trajectory of the disease
as they age. Using the diabetes care supplement to the Medical Expenditure Panel
Survey, I investigate the impact of health insurance and prescription drug coverage on
diabetics’ decision to monitor the disease, to use various treatments recommended under
the diabetic care guidelines and, indirectly, to modify their lifestyle. Since policymakers
ultimately care about health, I also estimate a health production function that captures
the relative productivity of different types of health behaviors in determining health. I
examine a measure of overall health as well as more specific diabetes-related outcomes,
such as the presence of eye and kidney problems.
I compare several methods to account for the endogeneity of insurance, health inputs
and health, ranging from a two-stage least squares instrumental variables approach to
a joint estimation of the demand for health insurance, medical care, health behaviors
and health. Through simulations, I assess the effect of insurance on the frequency of
checkups and examinations, the use of medications, lifestyle choices and, through these
inputs, on health. Additionally, I include various different specifications to test the
robustness of the model.
Joint estimation of insurance, medical care demand, lifestyle behavior and health
production equations that account for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity reveals
that the presence of insurance increases the likelihood of adhering to diabetes care
guidelines and that these behaviors do indeed improve health. Simulations show that
insurance with drug coverage leads to a three percentage point decrease in the probabil-
ity of diabetic eye problems and a two percentage point decrease in the probability of a
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kidney problem. Using figures from the literature on the disutility of blindness and the
value of life, this reduction in the probability of blindness is valued at approximately
$40,000. However, I find some evidence of ex ante moral hazard in that insurance with
drug coverage is associated with a drop in the probability of exercising regularly.
1.2 My Contribution
This paper contributes to the literature by determining the impact of health insur-
ance on the behavior of diabetics and health outcomes through an estimation procedure
that accounts for the joint nature of the insurance, medical care and lifestyle behavior
decisions. I use a sample of diabetics from a nationally representative survey, allowing
for more objective measures of health outcomes. Furthermore, I examine cross-price
effects of insurance coverage on medical care demanded and lifestyle behaviors that are
believed to play a major role in the health of diabetics.
1.3 Overview of Chapters
The remainder of this dissertation is organized in the following chapters: Chapter 2
provides background on health insurance and its influence on medical care and lifestyle
decisions and ultimately health, including an overview of pertinent literature. Chapter
3 lays out the theoretical framework in terms of utility maximization subject to time
and budget constraints and the evolution of health. Chapter 4 describes the data used in
this dissertation. Chapter 5 describes the main empirical model, likelihood function and
estimation strategy. Chapter 6 presents results including a health insurance simulation
that simulates the effects of a Medicare-like policy for diabetics. Chapter 7 provides
results of alternative specifications of the model and Chapter 8 concludes and describes
future avenues of research.
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Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Health Insurance
Beginning in the 1970s, health insurance and its effects on the use of medical services
in the United States have been under rigorous scrutiny by researchers and policymakers.
The wide array of insurance contracts and the mix of public and private provision
in the United States make for an interesting and important topic for investigation.
However, a difficult aspect of studying health insurance decisions is dealing with adverse
selection into insurance contracts that have different characteristics. Researchers cannot
simply examine the level of utilization for individuals with various insurance plans,
since individuals self-select into insurance contracts. At the end of the 1970s, the
RAND Corporation, with public support, embarked on an experiment to randomly
assign different health insurance plans and monitor medical care decisions over the
next three to five years. About 1000 volunteers in six different locations were assigned
random insurance plans that varied by coinsurance rate (from 0 to 95 percent paid
by the individual) and by other features such as deductibles and services covered.
Estimates of the price (co-insurance) elasticity of demand for medical services were
small, but nonzero. The study found that increased cost sharing affected utilization
by reducing the likelihood of any use, but once the service was used, the quantity did
not vary much by insurance coverage (Manning et al., 1987). Other studies have found
a significant impact of health insurance on medical care demand. Using Australian
data from 1977-1978 Cameron et al. (1988) find evidence that more generous insurance
coverage increases the use of health services after controlling for selection into different
plans.
More recently, focus has turned to the effects of insurance policies with differen-
tial cost-sharing by service type. In particular, several studies examine the cross-price
effects of increased prescription drug cost-sharing. A Canadian study finds that an in-
crease in drug copayments among the elderly is associated with a reduction in utilization
that leads to greater use of hospital emergency rooms and increased hospitalizations
and a rise in overall health care costs (Tamblyn et al., 2001). Yang, Gilleskie and
Norton (2004) estimate a dynamic model of medical care demand and health using
data from the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey to examine cross price effects be-
tween prescription drugs, physician services, hospital care and the subsequent impact
on health from the presence of prescription drug coverage. They show that universal
prescription drug coverage would increase drug expenditures by 20 to 35 percent over
five years while inpatient and physician service use would increase only slightly. Most
of this increase is attributed to reduced mortality.
2.2 Effects of Health Insurance on Health
Ultimately, a study of the impact of health insurance is not complete without exam-
ining the resulting effects on health. The RAND study found positive health outcomes
for poor adults in bad health. Those in the zero coinsurance plan (no out-of-pocket
payments at all) showed a significant reduction in blood pressure compared with poor
adults with high blood pressure in cost-sharing plans. The same results were found
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for myopia correction and dental problems. Although the study found no significant
benefits for the average person, the authors admit that the health outcomes examined
were relatively common chronic conditions where a diagnostic test was rather inexpen-
sive.1 Most other studies that examine the health effects of insurance policy changes
focus on supply-side cost sharing mechanisms, such as Medicare’s prospective payment
of hospital services, and the results have not been conclusive (Cutler and Zeckhauser,
2000).
Furthermore, moral hazard in health insurance adds complications by reducing in-
centives for prevention.2 Ehrlich and Becker (1972) use an expected utility model in
which individuals can respond to any type of uncertainty by purchasing market in-
surance that provides income should a bad state occur, by engaging in self-protection
activities that reduce the probability of a bad state and by engaging in self-insurance
activities that reduce the loss from a bad state. This model can be easily applied
to health. Self-protection that reduces the probability of a bad state refers to self-
preventative measures such as brushing teeth and losing weight whereas self-insurance
involves diagnostic medical care such as mammograms and physicals. Market insur-
ance, in the extreme case, refers to health insurance that covers catastrophic health
outcomes such as cancer. If market insurance premiums are actuarially fair and ac-
count for self-protection activities, individuals will have the correct incentives, since
spending on self-protection lowers the cost of market insurance and individuals will
purchase the optimal amount of both. However, the informational asymmetry that oc-
curs from insurers’ inability to observe self-protection activities leads to underspending
on self-protection and overspending on market insurance. With this type of external-
1Manning et al. thus argue that money spent on better screening for the poor would be more cost
effective than full insurance.
2Moral hazard here refers to ex ante moral hazard, since the concern is the effect of insurance
on actions the individual takes before knowing his health state. Ex post moral hazard refers to the
behavior of individuals once the health state is known, such as purchasing too much curative care.
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ity, an insured individual ignores the effect of his own self-protection spending on the
premiums paid by others in the insurance pool. Empirical evidence points towards a
small moral hazard effect of purchasing market insurance, but is not conclusive (Kenkel,
2000). Additionally, Ehrlich and Becker argue that since the price of self-insurance is
not related to the probability of the negative event, it is likely to create a moral hazard
as well. They find market insurance and self-insurance to be substitutes, but in practice
health insurance coverage for each of them are commonly under one contract with the
same insurer, making it more difficult for individuals to choose the optimal amount of
both.
It may not always be the case that individuals substitute medical care for self-
protection because it is possible that market insurance and self-protection may be
complements. More self-protection can increase the marginal product of market insur-
ance in that increased self-protection can lower the probability of a bad state, which
may be rewarded by market insurance. Self-protection is encouraged if the price of
market insurance is negatively related to the amount spent on protection. This occurs
in the automobile industry where time spent accident-free commonly lowers premiums,
but it is not common in health insurance markets (although the presence of a pre-
existing conditions makes it more difficult to switch insurers and this can be viewed as
an increase in price.)
Ralph Bradley (2002) introduces a model where he can test for the presence of
adverse selection accounting for endogenous adverse selection, which is his term for ex
ante moral hazard. With adverse selection, the individual observes an exogenous signal
that the health insurance plan provider does not observe, which allows the individual
to better predict his illness. With endogenous adverse selection, the individual can put
forth effort, which the plan provider does not observe and therefore does not adequately
compensate. He finds that both types of adverse selection are indeed present.
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2.3 Diabetes
Another difficulty in estimating effects of health insurance on health outcomes is
choosing the proper measure of health. If health is defined as the mortality rate or life
expectancy, one might be led to conclude that the marginal contribution of medical
care use has been zero in the past few decades in developed nations. Other measures
such as Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs) have been used, but these also have
limitations since translating additional years of life into QALYs can be difficult with
chronic conditions that lower the quality of life, but are not fatal.
Using diabetics for analysis mitigates the problems with finding an adequate health
definition, since more “objective” measures of health can be used, such as the pres-
ence of diabetic-related eye and kidney problems. Furthermore, the lifestyle choices
of type 2 diabetics factor heavily in the likelihood of contracting the disease as well
as in controlling the severity of the symptoms. Self-prevention in diabetics via better
lifestyle habits is relatively low cost and highly beneficial. Although the results will
not translate to the average individual in average health, diabetes is a rapidly growing
problem affecting more and more of the world population.3 According to the Amer-
ican Diabetes Association, the total cost of diabetes, including direct costs in terms
of medical expenditures and indirect costs in terms of lost work days and permanent
disability, was $132 billion in 2002. The true burden of diabetes is likely to be even
higher as an estimated 6.2 million people went undiagnosed with diabetes in 2005.
Delays or noncompliance in recommended health care behavior may result in a
substitution toward other types of medical care that may be costlier and less effective.
A recent study of a group of diabetics finds that 17-33 percent receive no diabetes
medication whatsoever. Those who do not use any drug medication have 18 percent
3For example, with more sedentary lifestyles, China is facing an explosion in the prevalence of
obesity-related diabetes. In a survey from 19 provinces of China, the prevalence has tripled from 1970
to 1990.
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more physician visits and 15 percent more days in the hospital (Pharmetrics, 2004). All
individuals in this study are covered by some type of insurance, indicating that these
results represent a lower bound on the noncompliance of diabetics. In fact, 20 percent
of diabetics 18 through 64 were completely uninsured in 2002.4 Furthermore, Niefeld et
al. (2003) find that seven percent of all hospitalizations among type 2 diabetics can be
avoided by improved outpatient care of comorbidities. This is likely an upper boundary
on preventable hospitalizations, as they examine elderly diabetics, where comorbidities
are much more common.
Multiple studies find that medical care and self-care practices are sub-optimal and
that the majority of type 2 diabetics are overweight and do not follow dietary guidelines
(Hiss, 1996; Harris, 1996; Nelson et al., 2002). Using claims data from nine large firms,
Dor and Encinosa (2004) estimate that an increase in the coinsurance rate from 20
percent to 75 percent results in an increase in the share of diabetics who never comply
with prescriptions by 9.9 percent. It reduces the share of fully compliant diabetics by
24.6 percent. They find that this decrease in drug expenditures amounts to $125 million
nationally, but leads to health complications that would cost an additional $360 million
in treatment. This number comes from a rough estimate of the higher expenditures of
diabetics with poor glycemic controls.
I use a sample of diabetics from a nationally representative survey to examine
the cross-price effects of insurance coverage on medical care demanded and lifestyle
behaviors that are believed to play a major role in the health of diabetics. The next
section describes the theoretical model, which is the basis for the empirical results.
4This figure comes from the MEPS 2002 Household Component.
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Chapter 3
Theoretical Model
3.1 Motivation
The seminal work by Grossman (1972), describing a human capital approach to
health, provides a framework for examining individual-level health care demand and
health production. In Grossman’s model, health is a depreciating stock in which indi-
viduals must invest over time. Individuals do not receive utility from medical services
directly, but only through their positive effects on health.
In the theoretical model explained below, individuals derive utility from consump-
tion, good health and leisure. Health is determined by both medical inputs and lifestyle
behaviors. Medical inputs include diagnostic behaviors recommended by widely ac-
cepted diabetes care guidelines and medications used to treat diabetes. Lifestyle inputs
are measured by the amount of time spent on healthy behaviors such as exercise and
a healthy diet. Lifestyle inputs decrease leisure time as well as incur a monetary cost.
Health insurance affects the individual’s budget constraint by lowering the price of
medical care. The individual faces a health shock every period that is realized after
he makes his insurance decision, but before he chooses health inputs. Every period
an individual maximizes his lifetime utility by choosing among several health insurance
coverage alternatives, the level of medical care and the amount of time spent on lifestyle
behaviors subject to a per period budget constraint and time constraint.
3.2 Individual Choices
At the beginning of each period t, the individual i observes his health entering the
period and selects among health insurance alternatives j, denoted by Ijit, where
j =

0 uninsured
1 health insurance without drug coverage
2 health insurance with drug coverage
(3.1)
and
∑2
j=0 I
j
it = 1.
The individual also chooses the level of several health behaviors. These include
diagnostic medical care Dit = d, medical care Mit = m and lifestyle behaviors Lit = l,
conditional on his choice of insurance. Figure 3.1 depicts the timing of choices. For
simplicity, I drop the i subscript from all variables from here on.
3.3 Utility
The individual receives utility from consumption Ct, healthHt and leisure St. Utility
is described as
Ut = U(Ct, Ht, St) (3.2)
where ∂Ut
∂Ct
> 0, ∂Ut
∂Ht
> 0 and ∂Ut
∂St
> 0 and second derivatives are negative.
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Figure 3.1: Timing of key variables.
Note: An individual enters the period with health status Ht and chooses his insurance plan It before
observing health shock, t. He then chooses health inputs, Dt, Mt and Lt. Based on these choices
and t, health is updated to Ht+1 through the health production function.
3.4 Constraints
The individual allocates income between a composite consumption good and medical
services. The budget constraint is
Yt = Ct + Pr
j
t I
j
t + a
j
tDt + b
j
tMt + ctLt (3.3)
where Yt is income of the individual at time t. Ct is a composite consumption good with
the price normalized to 1, Prjt is the per period premium associated with plan j where
Pr0t = 0 and a
j
t and b
j
t represent the out-of-pocket responsibility of the consumer with
insurance plan j where a0 = 1 and b0 = 1. If Mt is viewed as prescription medications,
then b1 = 1. ct represents the monetary cost associated with lifestyle behaviors. Let
Pt = (Pr
j
t , a
j
t , b
j
t , ct) be a vector of exogenous monetary price variables.
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The individual also faces a time constraint. Since I do not model the decision on
the amount of hours worked, I abstract from the work decision and T¯ represents the
amount of time left over in a period after work. The remaining hours can be split on
leisure and on lifestyle behaviors: T¯t = St + Lt.
3.5 Health Production
Health in the next period is determined by health and health inputs in the current
period. That is,
P (Ht+1 = h) = f
h(Ht, Dt,Mt, Lt, Xt, t) h = 1, ..., H (3.4)
where t represents a health shock that affects the probability of entering each health
state. ∂f
∂Ht
> 0, ∂f
∂Dt
> 0, ∂f
∂Mt
> 0, ∂f
∂Lt
> 0 and all second derivatives are negative
(diminishing marginal returns). Xt is a set of exogenous socio-demographic variables
such as education, marital status, race and age.
3.6 Bellman Equation
Individuals in this model begin at time t = 1 and continue until t = T+1 at
which time they die. The objective of the individual is to choose a level of diagnostic
care, medical care, lifestyle activity and insurance plan so as to maximize his lifetime
utility. He must choose his insurance plan prior to the realization of his health shock,
but chooses the level of health inputs after the realization. Health evolves through a
production function that depends on the health shock and level of health inputs. State
variables include Ht, Xt, Pt and t. Written as a Bellman equation and substituting
the budget and time constraint into the utility function, the value of lifetime utility of
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Dt = d, Mt = m, Lt = l at time at t conditional on I
j
t = 1 and with t known is
Vjt(Ht, Xt, Pt|Ijt , t) = Ut(Yt − Prjt Ijt − ajtDt − bjtMt − ctLt, Ht, T¯t − Lt)+
+ β
[ H∑
h=1
P (Ht+1 = h|Ht, Dt,Mt, Lt, Xt, t)Wt+1(Ht+1, Xt+1, Pt+1)
]
.
(3.5)
At the beginning of time t, t is not known. The maximal expected value of lifetime
utility conditional on a particular insurance alternative is
Vjt(Ht, Xt, Pt|Ijt ) = Et
[
max
Dt,Mt,Lt
Vjt(Ht, Xt, Pt, t|Ijt )
]
(3.6)
The maximal expected lifetime utility unconditional on a particular insurance alterna-
tive (the last component of 3.5, but in time t) is
Wt(Ht, Xt, Pt) = max
Ijt
{
V0t (Ht, Xt, Pt),V
1
t (Ht, Xt, Pt),V
2
t (Ht, Xt, Pt)
}
where Ijt ∈ {0, 1},
2∑
j=0
Ijt = 1.
(3.7)
At t = T, the individual knows he will die the next period and therefore will not
buy insurance (I0T = 1), will not use diagnostic care and medical care and will not
spend any time on lifestyle activities. T is thus a high age such as 125 years. The value
of lifetime utility at time T is thus
VT = UT (YT , HT = h, T¯T ). (3.8)
Solving this optimization problem requires imposing functional forms for health
production and utility and leads to demand equations for Dt, Mt, Lt and insurance
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and health production that are functions of Ht, Xt and Pt.
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Chapter 4
Data
4.1 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), which first began in 1996, collects
data on medical care utilization, costs, and the sources of payment of a nationally rep-
resentative sample of Americans. The data contain health status measures, utilization
and expenditure by medical service, income and demographic measures. The MEPS
household survey follows individuals over two years with five rounds of interviews. In
each round, sample members are asked to recall medical conditions and expenditure
events since the last interview, with supplemental information collected from medical
providers identified by household respondents. Data collection rounds are launched
with a new sample each year, providing overlapping panels of survey data. Currently,
Panels 1 to 7, which cover 1996 to 2003 and include over half a million individual
interviews, are available.
Additionally, MEPS administers a Diabetes Care Survey (DCS) that gathers in-
formation on the medical care of those diagnosed with diabetes. Questions include
whether the individual treats diabetes with insulin injections, diet modification and/or
oral medications; the last time the individual had various diagnostic exams; the num-
ber of times the respondent had certain medical checkups; and whether the disease has
caused any kidney or eye problems. Information is gathered twice from each individual
over the two years. MEPS first began administering the DCS in 2000, with Panel 4,
and continued through Panel 7. Using information from the DCS combined with the
MEPS household survey allows for detailed analyses of the health care decisions of di-
abetics between 1999 and 2003. I am aware of only one other nationally representative
data set with information on diabetics- the National Health Interview Survey (NHIS),
administered by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The NHIS interviews
individuals only once, making analysis on the effects of insurance on health inputs and
health outcomes difficult due to the timing of decisions.
Data from the DCS are collected once a year over two years providing two observa-
tions for each individual, but other variables are collected five times over the two years,
allowing for the definition of an initial health condition. The total number of diabetics
that answered all or some of the DCS is 2,895. After restricting the sample by age
and the presence of key variables, the final sample of 2,154 person-years is comprised
of 1,077 individuals observed twice and covering years 1999 to 2003. Table 4.1 displays
the sample selection details.
The summary statistics of exogenous variables are in Table 4.2. Average age is
51 and the sample is evenly distributed with males and females. Fifty percent of the
sample report finishing High School as their highest degree. The latter portion of the
table report the means of exclusion restrictions.
4.1.1 Health Insurance
Although the MEPS Insurance Component collects extensive information on the
insurance plan characteristics that individuals are offered and hold, publicly-released
files contain limited information on the details of such plans. For the purposes of
this study, insurance alternatives are limited to uninsured and insured with or without
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drug coverage. Those on Medicaid are considered insured with drug coverage. Table
4.3 lists the sample means for the key variables. Five and a half percent report being
insured with no drug coverage. Twenty-four percent of the sample report purchasing
no insurance plan whatsoever.1
Table 4.4 shows how insurance changes over the two time periods. The majority
(82%) retain health insurance with drug coverage over the two time periods. Thirteen
percent remain uninsured both years and the remaining six percent switch coverage
over the two years. Health insurance here is defined using a variable in MEPS that
turns on if the individual was uninsured the entire year.
MEPS does not collect information on whether the individual did or did not have
prescription drug coverage the entire year. Instead, the information is collected for
each round of the 5 rounds MEPS interviews sample members. Thus, as an alterna-
tive health insurance variable, I use information from the rounds in each year. If an
individual had insurance in the first round of one year, but not the next two, he was
considered uninsured. Table 4.5 shows the percent of individuals who switch insur-
ance coverage between there two years including insurance without drug coverage as a
separate category.
The diabetics individuals in my model choose their insurance type. However, in-
dividuals in my sample are all diabetics and it is possible the uninsured were unable
to obtain insurance. Under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996, it was made illegal to be refused coverage into a group plan based on an pre-
existing condition if one had “credible” coverage for the previous 12 months. However,
there is no protection when moving from one individual (privately purchased) plan to
another. MEPS gathers information on whether an individual was ever denied insur-
ance. Very few people (18) in my sample reported ever being denied insurance due
1Based on Census data, 19 percent of individuals age 18-64 were uninsured in 2004.
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to their diabetes and of these only 5 reported to actually be uninsured. Furthermore,
these individuals appear to be evenly distributed across health outcomes.
Employer-provided insurance remains the most common way to obtain insurance
in this country. It is therefore arguable that individuals choose their job and health
insurance is ancillary. However, there is evidence that individuals who are offered
health insurance through the employer may not take it. I find that 35% of those who
are insured are not employed and 45% of uninsureds are not employed. Of the 35%
who are insured but are not employed, about 40% are not married and thus would not
be receiving health insurance through a spouse. I found very few people in my sample
to be self-employed.
4.1.2 Health Inputs
Diagnostic outcomes include variables on whether the individual obtained a blood
glucose HbA1c test at least twice in the last year, a foot examination in the last year,
an eye examination (with pupils dilated) in the last year, a blood pressure checkup in
the last three months and a cholesterol test in the last year. As shown in Table 4.3, 76
percent of the sample checked their blood glucose using a Hemoglobin A1c test at least
twice in the past year. The American Diabetes Association recommends a frequency of
two to four tests a year. According to a study administered by the Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention in 2004, 72 percent of adults with diabetes had their A1c tested
at least twice.2 The figures for the other diagnostics are similar as well.
Input behaviors in Table 4.3 include whether the individual currently treats diabetes
with diet modifications and/or whether he exercises at least three times a week. While
80 percent of the sample say they have modified their diet to treat their diabetes,
only 40 percent exercise at least three times a week. Three quarters of the sample
2The source is the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s National Diabetes Surveillance
System using data from Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System.
20
report the use of oral medications for diabetes treatment. I create eight mutually
exclusive combinations of the three input behaviors in order to examine relative trade-
offs between each category. Fewer than 10 percent of the sample engage in only one
activity and five percent report engaging in none of the behaviors. Almost 40 percent
use oral medications in conjunction with diet modifications, but only four percent
supplement oral medications with regular exercise. Twenty-seven percent of the sample
exercise regularly, modify their diet and use oral medications.
4.2 Health Outcomes
Health is measured by general health status and the presence of eye or kidney
problems. Diabetic-retinopathy is the most common diabetes related eye condition
and is found when diabetes has caused weaknesses and leakages in the blood vessels
of the retina. In the worst case, new blood vessels form around the retina, which
causes bleeding and swelling in the eye and results in partial or full blindness. Twenty-
five percent report the presence of an eye problem. This figure is consistent with the
CDC’s estimate that 20 percent of diabetics in the U.S. have moderate to serious eye
problems. Diabetes is also the leading cause of kidney failure. Fourteen percent of
the sample report the existence of kidney problems. This figure consistent with the 10
to 40 percent cited by the National Kidney Foundation. Forty percent of the sample
report being in fair or poor health.
Table 4.6 presents the percentage of individuals who reports eye problems by year.
Of the individuals with available observations in both years, 67 percent have an eye
problem in both time periods and 16 percent do not have eye problems in both time
periods. Eight percent report an eye problem in the second year and seven report not
having an eye problem in the second after having one in the first year. Approximately
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90 individuals do change eye status over the two years. Table 4.7 shows the same
information for kidney problems. Kidney problems are less common than eye problems
and 83 percent of individuals do not exhibit these problems in either year. Seven
percent do have kidney problems in both years and the remaining ten percent change
status over the two time periods.
4.3 Variation in Health Outcomes and Behaviors by
Insurance Type
Since my study examines the effects of insurance on behavior, it is interesting and
important to descriptively see how health outcomes and behavior varies between those
with and without insurance. The first part of Table 4.8 shows how health varies by
insurance. A higher percentage of uninsureds report eye problems and being in worse
health, though those with kidney problems appear to be equally distributed by insur-
ance type. Diagnostic tests are more common among those who are insured. Surpris-
ingly, the percentage of insureds who take oral medications to treat diabetes is not
much higher than the uninsureds who use oral medications. A higher percentage of
insureds modify their diet and exercise habits appear to be similar by insurance.
The lower portion of Table 4.8 shows socio-demographic characteristics by insurance.
A higher percentage of the uninsured are female and nonblack, which is counter to most
nationally representative statistics. A higher percentage of the insured live in an urban
area and have a high school degree compared with the uninsureds. In fact, 45 percent
of the uninsured sample do not have a high school diploma. Age is equivalent across
insurance groups, but the uninsured have an average 3.6 family members as opposed
to 3 for insureds. The mean income varies widely by insurance coverage. The mean
income for those who are insured with drug coverage is $48,000 compared with the
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mean income for uninsureds of $35,000. The poverty line for a family of four in 2005 is
$19,350. About 50 percent of the uninsured do have an income less than $25,000, which
would in general quality them or their children for welfare benefits including Medicaid.
However, they do not report being on Medicaid, but much of this might be due to low
Medicaid take-ups rates (Aizer 2003).
Table 4.1: Sample Determination
Criterion Individuals
Answered DCS 2,895
Aged 25 to 64 1,721
Key Variables Present 1,077
Two Time Periods ×2
Final Sample Size (person-years) 2,154
Note: Sample size is the number of individuals after
selecting for each criterion. The final sample is 1077
individuals over two time periods, or 2,154 person-
years.
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics: Exogenous Variables
Variable Mean S.D.
Socio-demographic and Year Variables
Age 51.2 8.7
Family size 3.1 1.7
Income logged $45,474 37,870
Female 49.0
Black 17.0
Urban 74.6
Married 65.2
No degree 28.1
High school degree 50.3
College degree 11.0
MS or PhD 5.8
Other degree 4.7
Year 2000 26.4
Year 2001 27.4
Year 2002 32.1
Year 2003 14.1
Exclusion Restrictions
Insurance
Market level: uninsured 28.1
Market level: insured without drug coverage 6.1
Market level: insured with drug coverage 65.8
Diagnostic Care and Input Behaviors
Distance to doctor: less than 15 minutes 45.4
Distance to doctor: less than 15 minutes 39.7
Distance to doctor: greater than 30 minutes 14.9
Transport to doctor: drives or is driven 94.4
Transport to doctor: drives or is driven 4.2
Transport to doctor: walks 1.4
Input Behaviors
Market level: Exercise 3 times per week 55.2
Initial Health
More likely to take risks† 1.1
No meds to get over illness† 0.7
Note: All values are percentage values except Age, Family Size, Income and
medical rating variables, which are level values. †Ranges from zero (strongly
disagree) to four (strongly agree).
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Table 4.3: Summary Statistics: Insurance, Health Inputs and Health Outcomes
Variable (%) Mean
Insurance
Insurance, Drug 70.4
Insurance, no drug 5.5
No insurance 24.1
Diagnostic†
HBA1c test 2+ 75.7
Check feet 66.1
Check eyes 68.1
Check cholesterol 85.4
Check blood pressure 74.0
Input Behaviors
Modify diet 81.3
Exercise 3× per week 41.7
Use oral meds 74.3
Input Behaviors - Categories
None 5.3
Diet only 9.3
Exercise only 2.6
Oral meds only 7.2
Diet and exercise only 8.6
Diet and oral meds only 36.5
Exercise and oral meds only 3.7
Diet, exercise and oral meds 26.9
Health
Eye problem 25.5
Kidney problem 13.9
Health is excellent 22.3
Health is good 37.4
Health is poor/fair 40.1
†Diagnostic care variables are all yearly check-ups
except for blood pressure, where measurement is rec-
ommended every three months.
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Table 4.4: Percentage of Each Insurance Type in Time 1 and 2
Insurance in t = 2
Ins. Drug Uninsured
Insurance in t = 1
Ins. Drug 81.2 3.2
Uninsured 2.6 13.0
N = 1077 available observations in both years
Table 4.5: Percentage of Each Insurance Type in Time 1 and 2
Insurance in t = 2
Ins. Drug Ins. No Drug Uninsured
Insurance in t = 1
Ins. Drug 67.1 1.5 3.7
Ins. No Drug 1.0 4.5 0.0
Uninsured 3.7 0.5 18.0
Table 4.6: Percentage with Eye Problems in Time 1 and 2
Eye Problems in t = 2
No Yes
Eye Problems in t = 1
No 68.9 8.1
Yes 7.4 15.6
Table 4.7: Percentage with Kidney Problems in Time 1 and 2
Kidney Problems in t = 2
No Yes
Kidney Problems in t = 1
No 82.8 5.3
Yes 4.6 7.2
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Table 4.8: Means of Key Variables By Insurance Type
Insurance with
Uninsured
Drug Coverage
(N = 1844) (N = 343)
Health
Eye problem 25.1 27.6
Kidney problem 13.9 13.6
Health is excellent/very good 22.4 20.7
Health is good 36.8 36.7
Health is poor/fair 40.8 44.7
Diagnostic Behavior
HBA1c test 2+ 78.5 60.7
Check feet 67.8 57.0
Check eyes 70.8 53.7
Check cholesterol 87.6 73.3
Check blood pressure 76.0 63.4
Input Behaviors
Use oral meds 74.4 73.5
Modify diet 82.5 75.3
Exercise 3× per week 41.6 42.9
Socio-Demographic Variables
Female 49.6 54.5
Black 18.3 14.6
Urban 76.8 64.7
Married 65.4 63.0
No degree 24.7 44.0
High school degree 52.2 44.6
College degree 11.9 4.4
MS or PhD 5.7 4.7
Other degree 5.5 2.3
Age (years) 50.9 51.2
Family size 3.0 3.6
Income ($) 48,009 35,437
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Chapter 5
Empirical Framework
5.1 Equation Specification
Solution to the theoretical model yields a set of demand equations for insurance,
medical care, diagnostic care, lifestyle behaviors and a production function for health.
A Taylor series expansion of the maximal lifetime value function, V jt (Ht, Xt, Zt|Ijt )
(Equation 3.6), suggests the following multinomial logit probability of choosing each
insurance alternative. The dependent variable is the log odds that an individual chooses
insurance alternative I0t = 1 (uninsured) or I
1
t = 1 (insurance with no drug coverage)
relative to I2t = 1 (insurance with drug coverage). Explanatory variables include health
entering period t, Ht, exogenous demographic variables Xt and a vector of relevant
exclusion restrictions Zt that affect the individual’s decision to purchase insurance, but
are excluded from the medical care equations. Xt and Z
I
t are listed in Table 4.2. The
insurance equation is specified as
ln
[
P (Ijt = 1)
P (I2t = 0)
]
= δj0 + δ
j
1Ht + δ
j
2Xt + δ
j
3Z
I
t + ρ
j
1µ, j = 0, 1 (5.1)
where µ represents permanent unobserved individual heterogeneity with factor loading
ρj1 for insurance alternative j.
1
The theoretical model implies a multiple outcome framework for estimating the di-
agnostic, medical and lifestyle behavior equations. I use a multinomial logit to estimate
the lifestyle and medical behaviors of exercising, modifying the diet and the using oral
drugs for diabetes treatment. Including all combinations of the three behaviors results
in eight mutually exclusive categories. Due to the number of diagnostic variables, I
estimate the diagnostic equations each as binary logits. The log odds that an individ-
ual chooses option b among the eight alternatives relative to engaging in none of the
activities is a function of his insurance choice It, health Ht, exogenous factors Xt and
relevant exclusion restrictions ZBt (see Table 4.2). The eight alternative input behavior
(Bt) multinomial logit is written as
ln
[
P (Bt = b)
P (Bt = 0)
]
= βb0 + β
b
1It + β
b
2Ht + β
b
3Xt + β
b
4Z
B
t + ρ
b
2µ, b = 0, ..., 7. (5.2)
Similarly, the binary logit specification for each diagnostic equation is specified as
1The logit probability (simplified to a binary logit) is motivated as follows:
Utility(if insurance choice 0) = Vj=0t (Xt) = Xβ
∗
0 + 
∗
0
where Xt is a vector of state variables as described in Chapter 3 and the ∗ indicates the value of
the parameter at the maximal expected lifetime utility level for a given insurance choice. Similarly,
Utility(if insurance choice 1) = Vj=1t (Xt) = Xβ
∗
1 + 
∗
1
The probability of an individual choosing insurance alternative 1 is
P(choose insurance choice 1) = P(Xβ∗1 + 
∗
1 ≥ Xβ∗0 + ∗0).
Let β∗ = β∗1 − β∗0 and ∗ = ∗0 − ∗1 The probability of choosing insurance alternative 1 is now
P(choose insurance choice 1) = P(Xβ∗ ≥ ∗) = logit(Xβ).
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ln
[
P (Dt = 1)
P (Dt = 0)
]
= ψ0 + ψ1It + ψ2Ht + ψ3Xt + ψ4Z
D
t + ρ3µ (5.3)
The health production function is modeled with a multinomial logit where the depen-
dent variable is the log odds that an individual’s health next period is h where h = 0
(fair/poor health) or h = 1 (good health) or h = 2 (very good/excellent health). The
explanatory variables include current health Ht, diagnostic Dt, medicalMt and lifestyle
Lt care along with interactions with current health. The interactions allow more flex-
ibility in the relationship between current health and medical behaviors in explaining
health next period. Health is written as
ln
[
P (Ht+1 = h)
P (Ht+1 = 2)
]
= αh0Ht + α
h
1Dt + α
h
2Lt + α
h
3Mt + α
h
4Ht ×Dt
+ αh5Ht × Lt + αh6Ht ×Mt + αh7Xt + ρh4µ, h = 0, 1
(5.4)
where Xt includes the variables in the top portion of Appendix Table 4.2 excluding
income. Similarly, binary logit specifications are used for the probability of eye and
kidney problems. They are written as
ln
[
P (Et = 1)
P (Et = 0)
]
= φ0Ht + φ1Dt + φ2Lt + φ3Mt + φ4Ht ×Dt
+ φ5Ht × Lt + φ6Ht ×Mt + φ7Xt + ρ5µ
(5.5)
and
ln
[
P (Kt = 1)
P (Kt = 0)
]
= ϕ0Ht + ϕ1Dt + ϕ2Lt + ϕ3Mt + ϕ4Ht ×Dt
+ ϕ5Ht × Lt + ϕ6Ht ×Mt + ϕ7Xt + ρ6µ.
(5.6)
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Since lagged health is not observed for the first time period, I also estimate an initial
health equation.
The error term for each equation is written as ρqµ + qt where q = 1, 2, .., 6. It is
composed of a permanent, time-invariant unobserved individual factor µ, which does
not vary across equations, but the effects of µ in each equation is measured by a
factor loading ρe. qt are independent mean zero errors that are distributed logistically.
The equations must be estimated jointly since the error terms are correlated across
equations. The following section describes the estimation method in detail.
5.2 Estimation Strategy
In order to obtain unbiased estimates of the parameters of the model, I must ac-
count for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity that can lead to spurious correlation
between dependent and explanatory variables. One way to do this is to treat the un-
observed factor as a fixed individual effect. However, this would result in a loss of 1077
degrees of freedom and I observe only two time periods per person. Instead, I treat µ
as a random effect and integrate it out of the model. Instead of imposing parametric
assumptions about the form of these terms, I use the discrete factor approach described
by Heckman and Singer (1984), Mroz (1999) and Mroz and Guilkey (1992).
The discrete factor random effects framework assumes that µ consists of a distri-
bution of heterogeneity that is approximated by discrete mass points with associated
probability weights. These mass points and probability weights are estimated along
with the parameters of the model. The conditional joint probability of observing the
31
data for each individual for all time periods is
Li(Θ|µ) =
2∏
h=0
P (H1 = h|µ)Hhi1 ×
T∏
t=1
[
2∏
j=0
P (It = j|µ)I
j
it
×
5∏
d=1
P (Ddt = 1|µ)Ddit
[
1− P (Ddt = 1|µ)
](1−Ddit)
×
8∏
b=1
P (Bt = b|µ)Bbit ×
2∏
h=0
P (Ht+1 = h|µ)Hhi,t+1
× P (Et+1 = 1|µ)Ei,t+1
[
1− P (Et+1 = 1|µ)
](1−Ei,t+1)
× P (Kt+1 = 1|µ)Ki,t+1
[
1− P (Kt+1 = 1|µ)
](1−Ki,t+1)]
(5.7)
where Θ represents the parameters of the model (α’s, β’s, δ’s, ψ’s, φ’s, ϕ’s and ρ’s)
and P (•) represents the logit or multinomial logit probabilities associated with the log
odds equations from Section 5.1. The unconditional joint probability is obtained by
summing over the number of time invariant mass points is written as
Li(Θ, θ) =
M∑
m=1
θmLi(Θ|µm) (5.8)
wherem = 1, ...,M is the number of mass points and θm are the estimated weights asso-
ciated with each mass point. To estimate mass point locations and probability weights,
I impose the appropriate normalizations. The likelihood function is then calculated by
multiplying together the likelihoods for each individual:
L(Θ, θ) =
N∏
i=1
Li(Θ, θ) (5.9)
I use a maximum likelihood framework to estimate the parameters of the model.
The weights and mass points are estimated along with the parameters of the model. In
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order to ensure that the weights are between 0 and 1, the discrete factor model searches
over a series of parameters, γm, that satisfy
θm =
exp(γm)
1 +
∑M−1
k=1 exp(γk)
(5.10)
wherem = 1, ...,M−1 mass points. The last weight is simply calculated by subtracting
the estimated weights from 1. Mroz (1999) provides methods of choosing the optimal
number of mass points.
5.2.1 Identification
The effects of insurance are identified theoretically by the price of insurance (premi-
ums). Although these variables are not available, insurance characteristics of individu-
als in the surrounding area can also serve as variables that influence insurance purchase,
but do not affect the demand for care. Because state or zip code level identifiers are
not available in this public-use data set, I exploit information on all individuals in the
primary sampling unit from which sample members were randomly selected for survey
participation.2 I construct aggregate insurance characteristics that include whether or
not individuals have insurance and if so, whether or not they also have drug coverage at
the primary sample unit level. MEPS draws survey participants from over 200 sampling
units. For each individual, the aggregate insurance variable excludes that particular
individual.
In order for the market level insurance variable to be a good instrument, it must
be correlated with the endogenous variable, individual insurance. A regression of indi-
vidual insurance type on market level insurance and other exogenous variables shows
2Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2005) use the share of generic scripts in each MEPS primary sampling
area as an instrument for an individual’s use of generic scripts in order to explain the price of brand-
name scripts. They argue that this market-level measure proxies for laws in each sampling area that
encourage generic substitution.
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market level insurance and insurance without drug coverage to be jointly significant
with a χ2 statistic of 52.7. It is highly correlated with insurance type. The residual
from this regression should not contain any information in determining medical care
demand. Thus, the coefficient on this residual in a regression of medical care that
includes the endogenous insurance should not be significant. I do not find a t-stat of
more than 1 for the coefficient on this residual in any of the medical care regressions.
I then conclude that market level insurance is a good instrument for this study.
Travel time and mode of transportation serve to identify the diagnostic variables.
The input behavior multinomial logit is identified by market-level average exercise char-
acteristics and variables for the travel time and mode of transportation to the doctor.
Although oral medications can include non-prescription drugs, medications for treat-
ing diabetes symptoms are likely to require a physician visit to obtain a prescription.
Furthermore, the nonlinear form of these equations provide additional identification of
these variables.
Since lagged health is an explanatory variable in the health production function, I
need to describe the initial health state of individuals when they enter the sample. I
use variables that measure their preference for risk and medical care to explain their
health in the initial period they are observed. Means for all these exclusion restrictions
are listed in Table 4.2.
5.2.2 MEPS Primary Sample Units
The only publicly available way to break down the sample by geographic areas is
by using the PSU information from the MEPS sampling strategy. Using this infor-
mation assumes that individuals do not move during the year. This section provides
descriptions of the formation of PSUs and the variation between them.
There are 258 PSUs representing various areas in the United States. The number
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of households in each PSU vary widely from between 40 to over 1100. In some cases
one PSU will consists of one large metropolitan area, but others will be combinations
of areas that make up one metropolitan area. The identification strategy exploits the
exogenous variation between these PSUs. Figure 5.1 shows the percentage uninsured by
PSU. The percentage uninsured varies from 10 percent of the PSU to over 70 percent of
the PSU. Within 17 percent of the 258 PSUs, 20 to 25 percent of the PSU is uninsured.
In about 2 percent of the PSUs, there is a 70 percent uninsurance rate. The percentage
of each PSU with insurance not including drug coverage does not show as much varia-
tion. Figure 5.2 shows the percent insured without drug coverage by PSU. The values
stay between 0 and 20 percent for the most part. The mean is 6.1 percent and there
exist a few outliers, including one PSU with over 40 percent reporting insurance with
no drug coverage.
The variation in health insurance by PSU may be due to a variety of factors. One
possibility is the level of penetration of workers’ unions in a PSU. Unions may have more
power in negotiating health insurance directly from an insurer or through a firm for
their members and a location with a higher frequency of labor union membership may
mean lower health insurance premiums in general. Figure 5.3 presents a histogram
of the percentage of individuals who are members of a workers’ union by PSU. A
simple regression of union penetration on the percent uninsured in a PSU shows that
union status is statistically correlated with higher percentages of insurance across PSUs
(P − value = 0). However, union status maybe simply be picking up the level of
employment in each PSU. Including the employment rates of each PSU in the regression
did not make union penetration insignificant. I use the health insurance percentages
as instruments instead of union status because PSU level insurance may also pick up
other characteristics of each location, such as local laws affecting insurance companies’
presence and/or their premiums (Rizzo and Zeckhauser, 2005).
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Figure 5.1: Variation in Insurance by PSU
Figure 5.2: Variation in Insurance Without Drug Coverage by PSU
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Figure 5.3: Variation in Union Penetration by PSU
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Chapter 6
Results and Simulations
6.1 Goodness of Fit
The preferred specification is a joint estimation of the demand and production equa-
tions defined in Chapter 5 that accounts for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity
and its correlation across equations.
To assess that the model fits the data well, Table 6.1 compares means predicted from
the model with actual means from the summary statistics in Table 4.3. Dependent
variables are predicted with the estimated coefficients each period and then used to
update the endogenous explanatory variables in the next period. In the first period, the
predicted value of initial health is used to update health in the insurance, diagnostic and
input behavior equations. The means are very similar, demonstrating that the model
fits the means of the actual data rather well. A χ2 goodness of fit test (also known
as a Pearson’s χ2 test) tests the null hypothesis that the frequency of occurrence of
an event in the actual and observed samples are from the same frequency distribution.
The test statistic is χ2 =
∑n
i−1
(Oi−Ei)2
Ei
where Oi and Ei are the observed and expected
frequencies. The statistic is drawn from a χ2 distribution with two degrees of freedom
for the multiple outcomes and one degree of freedom for binary outcomes (since once
the number of individuals with eye problems is known, the number without is also
known). None of the calculated test statistics are anywhere near the range in which
the null hypothesis can be rejected.
Table 6.2 shows the distribution of the permanent unobserved heterogeneity. The
mass points are normalized to be between 0 and 1. The other mass points are estimated
to fall at 0.3 and 0.6, with most of the probability falling on 0.3.
In the next section, I show key results from the preferred model. For comparison,
I include results from a two-stage least squares instrumental variable approach and a
simple model where all explanatory variables are treated as exogenous. A full listing
of estimation results is provided in the Appendix.
6.2 Empirical Findings
6.2.1 Insurance Effects
In this section I describe the marginal effects of insurance with drug coverage on
diagnostic and medical care and lifestyle behaviors for three specifications: the preferred
model (labeled Joint); the two-stage least squares instrumental variables approach
(labeled IV ); and a simple model where each equation is estimated independently with
logit specifications (labeled Exogenous).
Marginal effects for discrete outcome models are more complicated than for contin-
uous outcomes. For a logit model where
P(Y = 1) = logit(β1x1 +Xβ), (6.1)
the effect on Y , the outcome of interest, of a one unit change on x1 is not simply
β1 as would be the case with a continuous Y . Instead, the marginal effect is the effect
on P (Y = 1) of a discrete change in x1 and is written as
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∆P (Y = 1)
∆x1
=
exp(β1 +Xβ)
1 + exp(β1 +Xβ)
− exp(Xβ)
1 + exp(Xβ)
. (6.2)
for binary x1. The marginal effect of x1 depends on the value of X and β. In evaluating
the marginal effect, I leave all other x’s besides x1 at their observed values. Standard
errors are bootstrapped using 500 draws.
The IV model requires the estimation of two stages. Because each stage involves
discrete outcomes, I cannot run logit regressions in each stage and simply use the
predicted value from the first stage in the second stage. Instead, I treat insurance
as a binary variable use a linear probability model in the first stage and include the
predicted residual in the second stage. The standard errors are bootstrapped with 500
draws.
Table 6.3 lists the marginal effects of insurance with drug coverage compared with no
insurance on each of the diagnostic care and input behavior variables. Considering the
Exogenous model first, insurance with drug coverage is associated with an increase in
the probability of seeking diagnostic care, ranging from an 8 percent increase in seeking
a foot exam to a 14 percent increase in the probability of obtaining a blood glucose
exam. However, these results are misleading, as it is likely that sicker individuals seek
more diagnostic care and are also more likely to purchase insurance. Not accounting
for this self-selection into insurance plans will lead to an upward bias on the effect of
insurance. The Joint and IV framework address this problem by using instruments
that affect insurance selection, but do not affect medical care to predict insurance,
purging the variable of endogeneity. In the IV specification, the presence of insurance
is regressed on market-level insurance characteristics and other exogenous variables in
the first stage. In the second stage, the health inputs are estimated using the predicted
residuals for insurance.
As expected, the insurance effects from the IV and Joint models are smaller than
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the Exogenous estimates, indicating that adverse selection is present. That is, failure to
account for the adverse selection yields parameter estimates that are biased upwards.
However, the IV results are all insignificant. The Joint estimates are generally larger
than the IV estimates and are significant for the diagnostic care variables. Using
a Hausman specification test, I compare the Joint and IV models. I test that the
consistent IV specification differs from the Joint model, which is assumed to be efficient.
The test statistic is H = (βc − βe)′(Vc − Ve)−1(βc − βe) where c denotes consistent,
e indicates efficient and V is the variance of each estimator. I find that none of the
resulting Chi squared distributed statistics are significant at any traditional significance
levels, indicating that the IV model does not contain any additional information not
in the Joint model i.e., the Joint model is also consistent. The Joint estimation is
preferred as it allows for the unobserved characteristics to affect each equation through
a permanent heterogeneity term.
The effects of drug coverage on diagnostic care and input behaviors are shown in
Table 6.4. Not surprisingly, the coefficients are mostly insignificant due to the small
number of people in the sample who are insured without drug coverage.
6.2.2 Health Production
The health production equations include interactions between lagged health and
health inputs (both discrete variables). The marginal effect an interacted variable
must account for the additional term. For a logit model where
P(Y = 1) = logit(β1x1 + β2x2 + β12x1x2 +Xβ), (6.3)
the marginal effect of x1 on P (Y = 1) is now
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∆P (Y = 1)
∆x1
=
exp(β1 + β2x2 + β12x2 +Xβ)
1 + exp(β1 + β2x2 + β12x2 +Xβ)
− exp(β2x2 +Xβ)
1 + exp(β2x2 +Xβ)
. (6.4)
Table 6.5 reports the marginal effects of health inputs on health outcomes from the
Joint, IV and Exogenous approaches. In the IV estimation, health, measured by the
presence of eye and kidney problems, is estimated in the second stage. The first stage
consists of diagnostic, medical and lifestyle behaviors regressed on insurance, education
and other socio-demographic variables. Since insurance is endogenous, I include the
instruments for insurance instead of insurance in the first stage.
The estimates from the exogenous model on diagnostic care and input behaviors
are generally the incorrect sign, which is consistent with biases attributed to the en-
dogeneity of health inputs. The IV and Joint estimations correct for this endogeneity,
but once again the IV estimates are insignificant. In both the IV and Joint estima-
tion, the probability of an eye problem generally decreases with diagnostic care and
input behaviors. From the Joint model, diagnostic care decreases the probability of
eye problems by up to three percent by seeking a blood glucose exam at least twice in
the last year, though checking blood pressure in the last three months did not appear
to affect the probability of an eye problem. Lifestyle changes are associated with a
drop in the probability of eye problems in both specifications, but the IV estimates are
several orders larger and insignificant. Using oral medications for diabetes treatment
significantly lowers the probability of an eye problem by almost four percent in the
Joint estimation. The results on the probability of kidney problems are similar, though
obtaining an HBA1c test at least twice a year does not appear to be associated with a
lower probability of kidney problems.
A Hausman test on each of the diagnostic care and input behavior variables con-
cludes that the IV model does not provide any additional information, assuming the
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Joint model is correct. In addition, the IV estimates do not account for any hetero-
geneity in individuals not captured by observed covariates. For example, an unobserved
preference for self-protection that is omitted from the IV equation would bias the es-
timates on lifestyle behaviors upward (a larger negative number in this case), since
the positive health effects of self care would be captured by the variables that are also
affected by unobserved self-protection preferences. Table 6.6 lists the coefficient, ρ, on
the unobserved heterogeneity term, µ, for each of the jointly estimated equations. The
coefficient is negative and significant in the health equations (except in the comparison
of good health with excellent health, but this is a self-reported measure and the differ-
ence between very good and good health may not be so distinct). It is also negative
and significant in all the diagnostic equations. This is consistent with the existence of
an unobserved preference for self-protection that decreases the likelihood that the in-
dividual seeks diagnostic care, but positively affects health. The coefficient on µ is also
negative on the lifestyle behaviors, which is counterintuitive with µ as an unobserved
preference for self-protection. However, the coefficients are small and insignificant on
exercise (and significant at the 10 percent level on diet only), but larger and signifi-
cantly different from zero on the use of medications, even in conjunction with diet and
exercise, which is consistent with an aversion to formal care.
6.3 Health Insurance Simulation
In order to capture the full effects of insurance on health, I simulate three cases using
the results from the Joint model: (1) all individuals are uninsured; (2) all individuals
are insured without prescription drug coverage; and (3) all individuals are insured with
drug coverage. For each case, the simulation is performed by using predicted outcomes
from the estimated coefficients every period to update the endogenous explanatory
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variables in the next period.
Columns (1) through (3) of Table 6.7 list the percentage of individuals who engage
in each activity under each insurance scenario from simulations of the model. The fol-
lowing three columns report percentage point changes between the insurance scenarios.
The presence of insurance coverage without drug coverage (Column (2)-(1)) increases
the probability of obtaining diagnostic care compared with no insurance. The proba-
bility of obtaining a cholesterol test increases by 14 percentage points and is the only
change that is significant. The probability of exercising decreases by nine percentage
points indicating that some amount of moral hazard may exist, but this value is not
significant. As expected, the probability of using oral medications decreases. Column
(3)-(2) reports the effects of drug coverage (conditional on insurance coverage). None
of the values are significant and the probability of an eye and cholesterol exam de-
crease with the drug coverage. The last column reports the total effect of insurance
with drug coverage on these health behaviors. The probability of obtaining each of the
diagnostic check-ups increases by at least six percentage points and are all significantly
different from zero. The probability of modifying the diet increases by eight percentage
points and is significant at the 10 percent level, indicating that individuals do allocate
resources to this lifestyle behavior.
The diet, exercise and medications outcomes in Table 6.7 take a value of one if the
individual engages in any of the activities regardless of the values for the other two.
Table 6.8 shows the insurance simulation results for combinations of the three activities
in eight mutually exclusive categories. Interestingly, the probability of not engaging
in any activity increases by eight percent with insurance. However, it decreases by
over nine percent with drug coverage and the overall effect is insignificant. Besides
diet modifications in conjunction with oral medications, the probability of engaging
in any of the activities decrease with insurance without drug coverage, though not
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significantly. The decrease in the probability of oral medication use is expected, as the
individual specifically does not have drug coverage. It is not possible to interpret the
drop in the probability of diet and exercise as moral hazard without including diagnostic
care or other medical care as an outcome, which is left for future work with a larger
sample. The effect of insurance with drug coverage is reported in the last column.
The probability of exercising only and in conjunction with oral medications decreases,
though is imprecisely estimated. The probability of diet modifications in conjunction
with the use of medications increases by seven percentage points and is significant at
the one percent level.
Table 6.9 reports the total effect of insurance on health outcomes in the insurance
simulation. I find that individuals who are uninsured face a 27 percent probability of eye
problems while those with insurance including drug coverage experience a 24 percent
probability of this negative health outcome. Also, those with insurance face a lower
probability of kidney problems. The probability of eye and kidney problems decrease
with both insurance and drug coverage. Insurance with drug coverage decreases the
probability of eye and kidney problems by three percent and two percent, respectively,
and these values are significantly different from zero. For eye problems, this decrease is
attributed almost equally to the presence of insurance (1.5 percent) and drug coverage
(1.7 percent), whereas the presence of insurance accounts for more of the drop in the
probability of kidney problems than does drug coverage. General health measures do
not vary much in the simulations. The percentage in excellent or good health increases
slightly in the case with insurance including drug coverage and decreases slightly in
the case of insurance with no drug coverage, though these effects are not significantly
different from zero.
Figure 6.1 graphically shows the percentage of the sample with eye problems at
each age between 25 and 64 for the insured and uninsured simulations. The uninsured
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report more eye problems than the insured at every age. Both percentages rise each
year until age 57, when the percentage starts to fall. I do not model death in my sample,
but it is possible that those with the more severe cases of diabetes have died by their
late fifties and those who are left are in better health and therefore report fewer cases
of eye problems. According to Healthy People 2010 report by the U.S. Department
of Health and Human Services in 2000, approximately 1 percent of diabetes less than
age 65 die from diabetes. Figure 6.2 shows the same simulation for kidney problems.
Again, the uninsured consistently shower higher percentages of kidney problems than
the insured at every age. Although the percentage appears to level off at age 50, it
does not decrease.
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Table 6.1: Comparison of Model Mean Predicted Values and Actual Mean Values
Dependent Actual Predicted
Variable Mean S.E. Mean S.E.
Insurance
Insured with Drug 70.4 (0.5) 70.3 (1.7)
Insurance, no drug 5.5 (0.5) 5.5 (1.7)
No insurance 24.1 (1.0) 24.2 (1.5)
Diagnostic Behaviors
HBA1c test 2+ 75.7 (0.8) 76.1 (1.9)
Check feet 66.1 (1.2) 66.0 (2.3)
Check eyes 68.1 (1.1) 67.9 (2.2)
Check cholesterol 85.4 (0.9) 85.2 (1.5)
Check blood pressure 74.0 (1.1) 74.1 (2.0)
Input Behaviors
Modify diet 81.3 (1.0) 81.0 (2.4)
Exercise 3× per week 41.7 (1.1) 42.0 (2.5)
Use oral meds 74.3 (1.1) 74.2 (2.3)
Health
Eye problem 25.5 (1.1) 23.6 (1.8)
Kidney problem 13.9 (0.9) 12.5 (2.4)
Health is Excellent/VG 22.5 (0.4) 23.0 (1.7)
Health is good 37.4 (1.1) 37.4 (1.9)
Health is poor/fair 40.1 (1.3) 39.6 (2.1)
Note: Standard errors (in parentheses) on the predicted values
are parametrically bootstrapped with 500 draws.
Table 6.2: Distribution of Unobserved Heterogeneity from Estimation
Mass point Probability weight
0.00 0.13
0.29 0.52
0.60 0.31
1.00 0.04
Note: Mass points are normalized to be
between 0 and 1.
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Table 6.3: Marginal Effect of Insurance with Drug Coverage on Diagnostic, Med-
ical Care and Lifestyle Behaviors
From No Insurance
to Insurance with Drug Coverage
Dependent Variable Joint IV Exogenous
Diagnostic Behaviors
HBA1c test 2+ 7.0 (2.2)∗∗∗ 0.7 (5.5) 13.8 (3.7)∗∗∗
Check feet 4.4 (2.6)∗∗ 2.6 (5.0) 7.7 (3.5)∗∗
Check eyes 9.5 (3.1)∗∗∗ 2.1 (4.3) 13.4 (3.4)∗∗∗
Check cholesterol 9.1 (3.1)∗∗∗ 9.3 (5.7) 9.4 (2.7)∗
Check blood pressure 8.6 (2.8)∗∗∗ 5.2 (4.8) 12.3 (3.4)∗∗∗
Input Behaviors
Modify diet 9.7 (9.8) 4.1 (6.0) 7.8 (2.6)∗∗∗
Exercise 3× per week -0.7 (11.7) 0.2 (6.3) -1.3 (3.1)
Use oral meds 2.3 (9.8) 0.7 (6.3) 5.3 (2.8)∗
Note: All marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) are multiplied by 100.
Standard errors are bootstrapped nonparametrically for IV estimates and parametri-
cally for the Joint estimates using 500 repetitions. ∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1%
level; ∗∗5% level; ∗10% level.
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Table 6.4: Marginal Effects of Drug Coverage on Diagnostic, Medical Care and
Lifestyle Behavior
From Insurance with No Drug Coverage
To Insurance with Drug Coverage
Dependent Variable Joint IV Exogenous
Diagnostic Behaviors
HBA1c test 2+ 0.4 (10.1) -1.8 (10.2) 5.3 (5.0)
Check feet 2.0 (10.9) 3.3 (7.8) 6.9 (5.0)
Check eyes -2.6 (12.0) -2.4 (7.7) -1.1 (5.3)
Check cholesterol -13.4 (16.4) 3.3 (11.2) -12.8 (4.5)
Check blood pressure 1.0 (13.8) -6.8 (9.3) 3.3 (4.8)
Input Behaviors
Modify diet 17.9 (9.7)∗∗ 8.8 (9.4) 14.2 (8.8)
Exercise 3× per week 19.4 (10.1)∗∗ 7.6 (10.5) 17.2 (6.8)
Use oral meds 14.4 (8.2)∗∗ 1.5 (9.4) 20.4 (8.1)
Note: All marginal effects and standard errors (in parentheses) are multiplied
by 100. Standard errors are bootstrapped nonparametrically for IV estimates
and parametrically for the Joint and Exogenous estimates using 100 repetitions.
∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level; ∗∗5% level; ∗10% level.
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Table 6.6: Unobserved Heterogeneity Coefficients from the Joint Estimation
ρ Coefficient S.E.
Health†
Eye problem -10.9 (1.4)∗∗∗
Kidney problem -9.5 (1.4)∗∗∗
Health is good -0.1 (0.6)
Health is poor/fair -2.5 (0.7)∗∗∗
Diagnostic Behaviors
HBA1c test 2+ -5.9 (0.8)∗∗∗
Check feet -4.4 (0.7)∗∗∗
Check eyes -1.7 (0.5)∗∗∗
Check cholesterol -3.7 (0.8)∗∗∗
Check blood pressure -2.5 (0.7)∗∗∗
Input Behaviors‡
Diet only -1.5 (0.9)∗
Exercise only -0.7 (1.0)
Oral meds only -2.5 (1.0)∗∗∗
Diet and exercise only -1.0 (0.9)
Diet and oral meds only -3.9 (0.9)∗∗∗
Exercise and oral meds only -3.7 (1.1)∗∗∗
Diet, exercise and oral meds -3.8 (0.9)∗∗∗
Insurance§
Insurance, no drug 0.8 (0.8)
No insurance 0.2 (0.6)
Note: The unobserved heterogeneity term, µ, is approxi-
mated with four mass points of support and associated weights.
∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level; ∗∗5% level;∗10% level.
†The omitted category is excellent of very good health. ‡The
omitted category is not participating any activity. §The omitted
category is insurance with drug coverage.
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Figure 6.1: Simulation: Percentage with Eye Problems Over 40 Years
Note: Individuals are simulated starting at age 25 until age 64.
Figure 6.2: Simulation: Percentage with Kidney Problem Over 40 Years
Note: Individuals are simulated starting at age 25 until age 64.
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Chapter 7
Other Specifications
This section includes the results of various alternate specifications that test the
robustness of the main results.
7.1 Alternative Health Insurance Definition
The MEPS collects a health insurance variable that asks if the individual was unin-
sured the entire year. In order to test the robustness of my results, I use this variable
and treat insurance as binary - uninsured or insured all year, since there is no mea-
sure of prescription drug coverage all year. I redo the estimations and the simulations
and report the results in Table 7.1. The results do not change very much, though the
changes in health are now not significant.
7.2 Omitting Those On Insulin
A rather large percentage of the sample (25 percent) report using insulin. Twenty-
eight percent of the sample report using insulin. Of these insulin users, 42 percent
report eye problems and 23 percent report kidney problems. To examine whether the
results are driven by this group of severe diabetics, I re-estimate the main model using
a sample of those not on insulin. Since dropping those who use insulin decreases the
sample, I limit the insurance categories to uninsured and insured with drug coverage,
to ensure this is still enough observations in each category. I also estimate three binary
logits for diet modifications, regular exercise and oral medications, instead of a eight
category multinomial logit. Table 7.2 displays the results of a simulation of insurance
with drug coverage versus no insurance. Although the percentage of the sample with
eye and kidney problems decrease, those who are insured with drug coverage do show
a lower probability of reporting these health problems. Diagnostic care increases with
insurance with drug coverage, as does the use of oral medications and diet modifications.
Regular exercise decreases slightly. Over all, the changes do not cause the results to
differ very much from the main model results.
7.3 Exclusion of Medicaid and Medicare Enrollees
In the main model, Medicaid and Medicare participants are considered insured with
drug coverage. However, these individuals are likely to be very different from the non-
publicly insured. Being on Medicaid is not necessarily a choice, though Medicaid take-
up rates are certainly lower than 100 percent. Medicare covers non-elderly diabetics
whose kidneys have failed and need dialysis for survival. Nine percent of the sample
report Medicare coverage and 13 percent of the sample report Medicaid coverage. Table
7.3 reports the simulation results from estimation of the main model omitting the
Medicaid and Medicare population. Results change minimally. The probabilities of eye
and kidney problems decrease similarly with insurance coverage.
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7.4 Additional Measures of Health
Not only do diabetics face an increase in the risk of blindness and kidney failure, they
also experience higher rates of heart attacks, strokes and amputations. Using MEPS, I
include hearts attacks and strokes as health outcomes. I cannot explicitly observe if an
amputation occurred, so I do not model this health outcome. Additionally, following
Gertler and Simcoe’s (2006) paper on of the effects of diabetes management, I also
include the number of hospital visits in the year as a health outcome.
7.4.1 Including Heart Attacks and Strokes
I add two additional equations to the empirical model laid out in Section 5. I include
a binary dependent variable that takes on the value of 1 if the individual had a heart
attack in time period t. This is specified as
ln
[
P (At = 1)
P (At = 0)
]
= pi0Ht + pi1Dt + pi2Lt + pi3Mt + pi4Ht ×Dt
+ pi5Ht × Lt + pi6Ht ×Mt + pi7Xt + ρ7µ.
(7.1)
Stroke is similarly modeled as
ln
[
P (St = 1)
P (St = 0)
]
= γ0Ht + γ1Dt + γ2Lt + γ3Mt + pi4Ht ×Dt
+ γ5Ht × Lt + γ6Ht ×Mt + γ7Xt + ρ8µ.
(7.2)
Including these two equations in the model bring the total number of equations
estimated to 13. Approximately eight percent of the sample report having a heart
attack and five percent report having a stroke.
Table 7.4 shows selected coefficients from the logit specifications for the heart attack
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equation and Table 7.5 shows the same for a stroke. Since these tables show logit
coefficients, only sign and significance have interpretation. However, caution must be
taken in interpreting the magnitude and significance of the coefficient on the interaction
terms. Ai and Norton (2003) show that standard regression packages do not compute
the interaction effect correctly in nonlinear models since the cross derivative, which is
dependent on other independent variables, should be calculated. They show that proper
computation would lead to magnitude and significance variation by observation. I leave
the proper calculation for future work.
Use of diagnostic exams by themselves appear to be associated with having a heart
attack. However, for a given level of health, use of diagnostic exams appear to decrease
the probability of a heart attack. Regular exercise is associated with a lower probability
of a heart attack as is being female. Older individuals are more likely to have a heart
attack. In general, the same is true of strokes. Oral medications and exercise decrease
the probability of a stroke and interacting diagnostic care with health shows that at a
given level of health, use of diagnostic care is associated with lower chances of a stroke.
Age and gender do not appear to play a role in the probability of a stroke.
To see how health insurance affects strokes and heart attacks, I redo the insurance
simulation with this alternative model. Table 7.6 shows these results including heart
attack and stroke as health outcomes. The probability of both heart attacks and strokes
decrease by less than half a percentage point when moving from uninsured to insured
with drug coverage and are not statistically significant. Health insurance does not
appear to have an impact on these health outcomes, compared with eye and kidney
problems. Few people in this age group have heart attacks and even fewer have strokes.
I did not expect to see very large effects of health insurance on these health outcomes.
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7.4.2 Including Hospital Nights
Gertler and Simcoe (2006) find that inpatient hospital admissions decline by two
percentage points from a baseline admission rate of eight percent when enrolled in a
disease management program. In my sample, 13 percent report at least one hospital
night in a year (Gertler and Simcoe use quarters). I add an additional equation to the
model that takes on a value of one if sample member has a hospital night in the time
period. Table 7.7 shows the logit results for a model including hospital nights as a
health outcome. Diet modifications and regular exercise do not appear to significantly
affect hospital visits. Age is negatively associated with a hospital visit and gender does
not matter. The use of oral medications negatively affects whether the individual had
any inpatient services.
7.5 Effects of Diagnostic Care on Lifestyle Practices
As discussed before, the effect of health insurance on lifestyle practices may work
in various manners. I examine the effect of health insurance on lifestyle practices by
putting an individual’s health insurance type directly in the lifestyle practice equations,
but it is plausible that health insurance affects lifestyle practices though medical care.
Diagnostic exams in physicians’ offices are likely to lead to better education on diabetes
management. Therefore, I specify an alternative method that allows health insurance to
affect lifestyle practices by including an index for diagnostic use in the lifestyle behavior
equation. The index is coded as one if the individual reported engaging in at least three
of the diagnostic behaviors in a year. About 90 percent of the sample did engage in
at least three diagnostic activities. The results of the health insurance simulation are
reported in 7.8. The results do not differ from the main model. Furthermore, I do not
find the index to be significant in the health input behavior equation.
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7.6 Medical Care Utilization
Individuals may consume medical care unrelated to diabetes as well. This con-
sumption may augment or sustain health over time. It may also be correlated with
unobserved poor health and modeling these jointly with the other behaviors will allow
me to better model unobserved heterogeneity. Hence, I include the number of pre-
scription filled, physician visits, hospital nights and emergency room visits as inputs
to health. Table 7.9 presents the results of the insurance simulation with this alter-
nate model. Diagnostic behaviors do not change much - those with insurance are more
likely to use diagnostic care. Individuals fill more prescriptions with insurance and
report slightly more hospital nights, physician visits and emergency room visits and
the values are all statistically significant. Diet modifications increases with insurance
with drug coverage. Exercise decreases, but not significantly. The values on the proba-
bility of eye and kidney problems go down with insurance, but are not significant. This
specification is not my main one because utilization may occur for reasons unrelated
to diabetes.
7.7 Education
There is a large literature concerning education and health. Grossman (2005) re-
views the literature on the effects of schooling on nonmarket outcomes and provides
a conceptual framework with a particular focus on health outcomes. Education and
health affect the usefulness of each other. It is easier for healthy people to attain higher
levels of schooling. Additionally, more educated individuals are better informed on how
to live healthier lifestyles (allocative efficiency) and may also be better at using a given
level of health inputs to improve health (productive efficiency). In my model, education
of each individual is exogenously determined, but I allow education and medical care
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to interact in the health production function. Education is comprised of 5 categories
(No Degree, High School diploma, College degree, Masters or PhD and Other degree)
and health is comprised of 3 categories (Excellent/Very Good, Good and Fair/Poor).
I would expect a positive sign on the interaction term between education and medical
care, if Grossman’s productive efficiency is present.
Table 7.10 shows the logit coefficients in the health equations of these interactions.
The omitted education category is High School Diploma. In these equations, a negative
sign on the interaction term signifies better health. However, I interpret the interaction
term with the same caveat mentioned above. I do not find overwhelming evidence of
increased productive efficiency of health inputs due to better education. Conditional on
attaining advanced degree, obtaining an eye test is associated with better self-reported
health, but not eye and kidney problems. Obtaining a cholesterol test decreases the
probability of eye problems conditional on higher education, though not enough obser-
vations were available to see the effect on kidney problems. I do find the interaction
between education and oral medications to reinforce the productive efficiency hypoth-
esis in that the interactions with higher education levels are associated with better
health. However, most of the coefficients are not significantly different from zero.
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Table 7.1: Insurance Simulation: Level and Percentage Point Changes with Al-
ternative Insurance Definition
Insured
Uninsured with Drug Change
Variable (1) (2) (2)-(1)
Diagnostics
HBA1c test 2+ 70.3 76.7 6.4 (5.3)
Check feet 63.1 67.0 3.9 (4.3)
Check eyes 59.0 70.8 11.8 (3.8)∗∗∗
Check cholesterol 79.5 87.0 7.5 (3.2)∗∗
Check blood pressure 66.2 73.7 7.5 (4.2)∗
Input Behaviors
Modify diet 76.1 83.9 7.8 (5.6)
Exercise 3× per week 46.5 42.3 -4.2 (5.4)
Use oral meds 74.8 75.4 0.6 (5.3)
Health
Eye problem 25.8 23.3 -2.5 (2.2)
Kidney problem 13.9 12.4 -1.5 (1.9)
Health is good 40.9 40.7 -0.2 (2.4)
Health is poor/fair 35.8 35.3 -0.5 (2.1)
Note: Standard errors in () are bootstrapped with 500 draws.
∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level; ∗∗5% level; ∗10% level.
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Table 7.2: Simulation: Level Percentages With Only Those Not on Insulin
Insured
Uninsured with Drug Change
Variable (1) (2) (2)-(1)
Diagnostic Behaviors
HBA1c test 2+ 73.3 77.8 4.5 (1.9)∗∗
Check feet 62.1 64.7 2.6 (1.9)
Check eyes 62.2 72.0 9.8 (1.9)∗∗∗
Check cholesterol 82.6 89.1 6.5 (1.4)∗∗∗
Check blood pressure 68.2 75.3 7.1 (1.9)∗∗∗
Input Behaviors
Modify diet 78.1 82.7 4.6 (1.6)∗∗∗
Exercise 3× per week 49.3 46.2 -3.1 (2.0)
Use oral meds 78.2 79.1 0.9 (2.1)
Health
Eye problem 22.7 20.3 -2.4 (1.7)
Kidney problem 12.0 10.5 -1.5 (1.3)
Health is good 41.9 41.9 0.0 (2.1)
Health is poor/fair 33.7 33.4 -0.3 (2.1)
Note: Standard errors in () are bootstrapped with 500 draws.
∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level; ∗∗5% level; ∗10% level.
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Table 7.3: Insurance Simulation: Level Percentages Without Medicaid and
Medicare Enrollees
No Insurance Insurance
Insurance No Drug With Drug Change
Variable (1) (2) (3) (3)-(1)
Diagnostic Behaviors
HBA1c test 2+ 66.6 72.3 77.0 10.4 (5.1)∗∗
Check feet 60.1 59.3 66.7 6.6 (4.7)
Check eyes 58.4 70.1 70.5 12.1 (5.3)∗∗
Check cholesterol 78.0 92.6 86.7 8.7 (5.1)∗
Check blood pressure 65.6 72.9 75.1 9.5 (4.7)∗∗
Input Behaviors
Modify diet 77.7 75.0 83.7 6.0 (5.5)
Exercise 3× per week 45.8 36.2 44.1 -1.7 (5.7)
Use oral meds 73.4 65.8 77.1 3.7 (5.5)
Health
Eye problem 25.7 25.3 22.1 -3.6 (1.9)∗
Kidney problem 14.1 13.9 12.3 -1.8 (3.1)
Health is good 40.6 40.3 39.6 -1.0 (2.6)
Health is poor/fair 35.6 36.0 35.3 -0.3 (2.2)
Note: Standard errors in () are bootstrapped with 500 draws. ∗∗∗indicates significance
at the 1% level; ∗∗5% level; ∗10% level.
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Table 7.4: Heart Attack: Selected Logit Results
RHS Variable Coefficient S.E. T-Stat
Health is good 3.04 1.61 1.90
Health is poor/fair 4.36 1.55 2.81
HBA1c test 2+ 0.27 0.74 0.36
Check feet 0.37 0.68 0.55
Use oral meds 1.71 0.97 1.76
Check eyes -0.27 0.66 -0.40
Check blood pressure 1.55 0.83 1.86
Check cholesterol 0.56 0.83 0.68
Modify diet -0.71 0.76 -0.93
Exercise 3× per week -1.21 0.79 -1.53
Age 0.40 0.15 2.73
Female -0.78 0.36 -2.15
Blood glucose × good health -1.04 0.87 -1.20
Blood glucose × fair/poor health -0.30 0.80 -0.38
Feet checked × good health -0.42 0.90 -0.47
Feet checked × fair/poor health -0.53 0.80 -0.66
Oral meds × good health -1.86 1.07 -1.73
Oral meds × fair/poor health -2.33 0.97 -2.40
Eye checked × good health 0.38 0.88 0.43
Eye checked × fair/poor health -0.20 0.74 -0.28
BP checked × fair/poor health -2.27 0.96 -2.37
BP checked × good health -1.72 0.91 -1.88
Diet modifications × good health 1.13 0.88 1.30
Diet modifications × fair/poor health 0.51 0.76 0.68
Exercise × good health 1.89 0.89 2.12
Exercise × fair/poor health 1.29 0.86 1.49
Perm. het. loading, ρ 3.82 0.91 4.19
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Table 7.5: Stroke: Selected Logit Results
RHS Variable Coefficient S.E. T-Stat
Health is good 1.67 1.06 1.57
Health is poor/fair 1.30 1.03 1.26
HBA1c test 2+ 1.73 0.86 2.02
Check feet 0.31 0.73 0.42
Use oral meds -1.30 0.81 -1.60
Check eyes -0.86 0.75 -1.14
Check blood pressure 0.46 0.74 0.61
Check cholesterol 0.27 0.90 0.30
Modify diet 0.03 0.77 0.04
Exercise 3× per week -1.56 0.96 -1.62
Age 0.05 0.09 0.55
Female 0.13 0.64 0.206
Blood glucose × good health -0.83 0.98 -0.84
Blood glucose × fair/poor health -0.55 0.90 -0.61
Feet checked × good health -1.85 0.93 -1.98
Feet checked × fair/poor health -1.37 0.84 -1.63
Oral meds × good health 0.60 0.94 0.64
Oral meds × fair/poor health 0.06 0.83 0.07
Eye checked × good health 0.37 0.94 0.40
Eye checked × fair/poor health 0.91 0.83 1.10
Diet modifications × good health -0.64 0.92 -0.70
Diet modifications × fair/poor health -0.84 0.82 -1.03
Exercise × good health 1.90 1.07 1.78
Exercise × fair/poor health 2.14 1.03 2.07
Perm. het. loading, ρ 5.85 1.21 4.84
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Table 7.6: Insurance Simulation: Level Percentages Including Additional Health
Outcomes
No Insurance Insurance
Insurance No Drug With Drug Change
Variable (1) (2) (3) (3)-(1)
Diagnostic Behaviors (%)
HBA1c test 2+ 68.4 76.3 79.0 10.6 (4.3)∗∗
Check feet 61.7 62.7 67.8 6.1 (3.4)∗
Check eyes 60.4 71.1 69.9 9.5 (3.4)∗∗∗
Check cholesterol 79.4 91.4 87.0 7.6 (3.1)∗∗
Check blood pressure 67.0 74.2 76.4 9.4 (3.5)∗∗∗
Input Behaviors (%)
Modify diet 75.9 73.6 83.1 9.5 (5.2)∗
Exercise 3× per week 42.8 32.5 41.7 -1.1 (4.5)
Use oral meds 71.0 65.3 76.1 5.1 (4.4)
Health (%)
Eye problem 27.8 26.8 24.6 -3.2 (1.7)∗
Kidney problem 14.3 13.5 12.1 -2.2 (1.3)∗
Heart attack 7.4 7.6 7.0 -0.4 (0.9)
Stroke 4.1 4.5 3.9 -0.2 (0.8)
Health is good 38.0 37.8 37.4 -0.6 (1.3)
Health is poor/fair 40.5 40.8 40.0 0.5 (1.3)
Note: Standard errors in () are bootstrapped with 500 draws. ∗∗∗indicates significance at
the 1% level; ∗∗5% level; ∗10% level.
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Table 7.7: Hospital Nights: Selected Logit Results
RHS Variable Coefficient S.E. T-Stat
Health is good 2.03 0.95 2.15
Health is poor/fair 2.90 0.92 3.13
HBA1c test 2+ 1.73 0.63 2.74
Check feet 0.85 0.57 1.51
Use oral meds -1.18 0.71 -1.67
Check eyes -0.94 0.55 -1.71
Check blood pressure 0.38 0.57 0.67
Check cholesterol 1.53 0.77 1.99
Modify diet 0.32 0.64 0.49
Exercise 3× per week 0.11 0.73 0.15
Age -0.17 0.06 -2.57
Age squared 0.17 0.07 2.49
Female 0.09 0.17 0.54
Urban -0.39 0.17 -2.30
Blood glucose × good health -1.36 0.77 -1.76
Blood glucose × fair/poor health -0.99 0.70 -1.41
Feet checked × good health -1.49 0.74 -2.02
Feet checked × fair/poor health -0.49 0.66 -0.75
Oral meds × good health 1.09 0.78 1.40
Oral meds × fair/poor health 0.97 0.64 1.52
Eye checked × good health 0.76 0.72 1.06
Eye checked × fair/poor health 0.78 0.63 1.25
BP checked × good health 0.12 0.76 0.16
BP checked × fair/poor health 0.03 0.68 0.04
Cholesterol checked × good health -1.06 0.93 -1.14
Cholesterol checked × fair/poor health -1.26 0.84 -1.50
Diet modifications × good health 0.23 0.77 0.29
Diet modifications × fair/poor health -0.36 0.67 -0.53
Exercise × good health -0.26 0.75 -0.35
Exercise × fair/poor health -0.16 0.65 -0.24
Perm. het. loading, ρ 0.49 0.52 0.96
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Table 7.8: Insurance Simulation: Level Percentages With Alternative Insurance
Pathway
No Insurance Insurance
Insurance No Drug With Drug Change
Variable (1) (2) (3) (3)-(1)
Diagnostic Behaviors (%)
HBA1c test 2+ 66.0 78.8 77.4 11.4 (5.0)∗∗
Check feet 61.1 64.1 68.0 6.9 (3.9)∗
Check eyes 59.5 73.2 70.0 10.5 (3.5)∗∗∗
Check cholesterol 78.3 92.7 87.3 9.0 (3.5)∗∗
Check blood pressure 66.3 75.5 75.0 8.7 (4.0)∗∗
Input Behaviors (%)
Modify diet 74.5 75.8 82.7 8.2 (5.2)
Exercise 3× per week 43.4 33.8 42.4 -1.0 (5.1)
Use oral meds 71.7 67.0 76.8 5.1 (4.7)
Health (%)
Eye problem 26.2 25.6 22.8 -3.4 (1.8)∗
Kidney problem 14.8 13.4 12.0 -2.8 (1.5)∗
Health is good 38.9 38.2 38.5 -0.4 (1.5)
Health is poor/fair 40.0 40.2 38.9 -1.1 (1.4)
Note: Standard errors in () are bootstrapped with 500 draws. ∗∗∗indicates significance at
the 1% level; ∗∗5% level; ∗10% level.
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Table 7.9: Insurance Simulation: Level Percentages Including Additional Health
Inputs
No Insurance Insurance
Insurance No Drug With Drug Change
Variable (1) (2) (3) (3)-(1)
Diagnostic Behaviors (%)
HBA1c test 2+ 68.3 77.9 80.3 12.0 (3.2)∗∗∗
Check feet 61.3 63.6 68.2 6.9 (3.0)∗∗
Check eyes 61.5 72.8 71.4 9.9 (2.9)∗∗∗
Check cholesterol 80.0 92.6 88.0 8.0 (2.3)∗∗∗
Check blood pressure 66.8 75.7 77.2 10.4 (2.9)∗∗∗
Input Behaviors (%)
Modify diet 75.9 75.5 83.8 7.9 (2.6)∗∗∗
Exercise 3× per week 44.2 33.9 42.8 -1.4 (3.0)
Use oral meds 71.5 67.3 76.3 4.8 (2.8)∗
Medical Care (level value)
Drug prescriptions 26.5 27.5 31.2 4.7 (1.5)∗∗∗
Hospital nights 0.7 1.3 1.1 0.4 (0.2)∗∗∗
Physician visits 5.1 4.8 6.0 0.9 (0.3)∗∗∗
ER visits 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.1 (0.04)∗∗
Health (%)
Eye problem 23.3 23.2 22.0 -1.3 (1.2)
Kidney problem 14.0 14.0 13.0 -1.0 (1.0)
Health is good 41.0 39.8 39.4 -1.6 (1.2)
Health is poor/fair 37.6 39.1 40.1 2.5 (1.3)
Note: Standard errors in () are bootstrapped with 500 draws. ∗∗∗indicates significance at
the 1% level; ∗∗5% level; ∗10% level.
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Table 7.10: Diagnositc Care Interacted With Education: Health Production Logit
Results
Fair/Poor Health Eye Kidney
Variable vs. Excellent Problem Problem
HBA1c x no degree 0.67 (0.74) 0.85 (0.79) 0.32 (0.74)
HBA1c x college -0.43 (0.86) 1.48 (1.00) -0.60 (0.90)
HBA1c x MS/PhD 0.40 (0.92) -0.07 (0.97) 0.02 (1.00)
HBA1c x other -0.41 (0.92) . . 0.24 (1.01)
Feet x no degree -0.72 (0.72) -0.11 (0.71) -0.33 (0.72)
Feet x college -0.56 (0.82) 1.04 (0.95) 0.09 (0.91)
Feet x MS/PhD 0.34 (0.90) 0.65 (0.97) 0.25 (0.98)
Feet x other 0.16 (0.91) -1.20 (1.02) . .
Eye x no degree 0.00 (0.67) 0.06 (0.75) 0.05 (0.74)
Eye x college -0.05 (0.85) 0.82 (0.94) -0.91 (0.90)
Eye x MS/PhD -2.06 (0.89)∗∗∗ 0.16 (0.97) 0.55 (0.98)
Eye x other -1.56 (0.93) -0.36 (0.99) 2.61 (1.02)∗∗
Cholesterol x no degree 0.21 (0.75) 0.08 (0.81) 0.76 (0.80)
Cholesterol x college 1.14 (0.89) -0.76 (0.98) 0.81 (0.93)
Cholesterol x MS/PhD -1.36 (0.96) -2.49 (1.22)∗∗ . .
Cholesterol x other -0.99 (0.93) -0.66 (1.02) . .
BP x no degree 0.48 (0.73) 0.67 (0.79) 0.58 (0.80)
BP x college 0.04 (0.81) -0.68 (0.94) 0.48 (0.91)
BP x MS/PhD -0.01 (0.90) 1.44 (1.23) . .
BP x other 1.34 (0.93) 2.62 (1.07)∗∗ 1.18 (0.98)
Oral Meds x no degree -0.25 (0.68) 0.45 (0.79) -0.73 (0.75)
Oral Meds x college -0.64 (0.81) -0.69 (0.94) -0.75 (0.90)
Oral Meds x MS/PhD -0.45 (0.91) -0.21 (0.97) -0.66 (0.98)
Oral Meds x other -0.68 (0.91) -0.43 (1.01) -1.91 (1.00)∗
Note: Logit results from a j estimation. Missing values are due to limited number of
observations in each category. ∗∗∗indicates significance at the 1% level; ∗∗5% level; ∗10%
level
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Chapter 8
Conclusion
8.1 Discussion
Understanding the medical care and lifestyle decisions and their effects on health
is a key factor in managing the growing diabetes epidemic. In this paper, I estimate
the effects of insurance coverage on diabetics’ use of recommended diagnostic care and
lifestyle modifications. Through these health inputs, I examine the effect of insurance
coverage on the health of non-elderly diabetics. I find that insurance with drug coverage
has significant positive effects on adherence to recommended diagnostic medical check-
ups after controlling for the self-selection into insurance plans. Insurance simulations
show that the probability of seeking diagnostic medical care increases by at least six
percentage points depending on the type of check-up. The probability of obtaining a
HbA1c blood glucose test at least two times a year increases by 11 percentage points
when insured with drug coverage compared to when uninsured.
The probability of diet modifications increases with insurance coverage and those
with insurance including drug coverage are also more likely to supplement oral medica-
tions with diet modifications, indicating that the lower price of medical care attributed
to insurance allows individuals to allocate more resources to diet improvements. There
is, however, weak evidence of ex ante moral hazard from insurance in that the proba-
bility of exercising appears to decrease in the presence of insurance.
Insurance simulations show that the probabilities of eye and kidney problems de-
crease with the presence of insurance. This drop is estimated to be up to three per-
centage points for the probability of eye problems and up to two percentage points for
the probability of kidney problems. The literature places the value of remaining life at
approximately $150,000 a year (Topel and Murphy, 2003). Using the current life ex-
pectancy figures from studies on the cost of blindness (Brown, et al., 2001; Meads and
Hyde, 2003) and the mean age of sample members, a three percentage point decrease
in the probability of blindness is valued at over $40,000.
8.2 Future Work
If health insurance can lead to these gains, then why are so many adults uninsured?
A recent paper by Bundorf and Pauly (2006) finds that affordibility is not the driving
force behind an individual’s decision to purchase insurance. Allocating resources so that
health insurance is “affordable” to all individuals may not achieve universal coverage
and mandating universal coverage may be infeasible in the U.S. Improving diabetes
management by subsidizing medical treatment alongside approaches such as monthly
reminders for diagnostic examinations may be a more practical way to improve the
health of diabetics. Diabetes management programs through the insurer or workplace
have been shown to be effective, but should perhaps be expanded to encompass diabetics
and pre-diabetics who do not have access to these programs.
It would also be interesting to examine the relationship between health insurance,
health behaviors and outcomes among diabetics using an alternative dataset. The
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) contains cross-sectional information on di-
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abetics and the Medicare Beneficiary Survey (MCBS) contains longitudinal data on
elderly diabetics.
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Appendix A
Estimation Results
Table A.1: Estimation Results for Initial Health
Good vs. Excellent Poor/Fair vs. Excellent
Variable Name Coefficient SD Coefficient SD
Constant -4.13 1.20 -5.37 1.36
More likely to take risks 0.13 0.09 0.22 0.09
Risk rating missing 0.44 0.88 -0.27 0.90
No meds to get over illness -0.12 0.08 -0.24 0.09
No meds missing -0.69 0.91 -0.03 0.90
Age 0.15 0.06 0.16 0.07
Age missing -0.15 0.07 -0.17 0.07
Female 0.18 0.42 0.18 0.46
No high school degree 0.03 0.57 0.75 0.53
College degree -0.09 0.52 -0.97 0.65
MS or PhD -0.69 0.83 -0.78 0.84
Other degree -0.08 0.80 -0.85 0.85
Black 0.25 0.62 0.31 0.65
Family size 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.08
Urban 0.03 0.60 -0.25 0.60
Married -0.04 0.49 -0.51 0.50
Year 2000 -0.13 0.70 0.22 0.72
Year 2001 0.06 0.61 0.27 0.60
Year 2002 0.40 0.63 0.35 0.67
Perm. het. loading, ρ 1.00 1.00 -2.32 0.67
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Table A.2: Estimation Results for Health
Good vs. Excellent Poor/Fair vs. Excellent
Variable Name Coefficient SD Coefficient SD
Constant 0.49 1.07 -2.68 1.26
Health is good 1.81 0.78 1.88 0.86
Health is poor/fair 2.19 0.82 3.88 0.83
HBA1c test 2+ -0.42 0.49 -0.97 0.62
HBA1c test 2+ missing 0.03 0.46 -0.03 0.55
Check feet -0.04 0.54 -0.33 0.62
Check feet missing -0.22 0.76 -0.09 0.80
Use oral meds 0.18 0.67 0.46 0.71
Use oral meds missing 0.15 0.86 2.04 0.87
Check eyes -0.41 0.49 -0.38 0.59
Check eyes missing -0.57 0.83 -1.11 0.86
Check blood pressure -0.05 0.45 -0.00 0.56
Check blood pressure missing 0.16 0.74 0.44 0.80
Check cholesterol 0.30 0.61 0.59 0.71
Check cholesterol missing 0.12 0.84 -0.08 0.89
Modify diet -0.02 0.63 0.31 0.69
Modify diet missing -0.39 0.85 -2.10 0.89
Exercise 3× per week -0.40 0.63 -0.68 0.69
Age -0.02 0.05 0.03 0.06
Age squared 0.03 0.06 -0.02 0.07
Female -0.12 0.26 -0.18 0.31
No high school degree 0.26 0.48 0.78 0.50
College degree -0.30 0.37 -1.00 0.55
MS or PhD 0.04 0.62 -0.20 0.75
Other degree -0.24 0.61 -0.69 0.78
Black -0.05 0.48 0.15 0.55
Family size 0.05 0.06 -0.01 0.07
Urban -0.52 0.38 -0.77 0.43
Married -0.12 0.36 -0.47 0.43
Blood glucose × good health 0.10 0.64 0.75 0.71
Blood glucose × fair/poor health 1.27 0.73 1.68 0.70
Feet checked × good health -0.52 0.63 -0.24 0.74
Feet checked × fair/poor health -0.59 0.76 -0.52 0.70
Oral meds × good health -0.04 0.68 -0.01 0.75
Oral meds × fair/poor health -0.47 0.74 -0.55 0.74
Eye checked × good health 0.64 0.65 0.13 0.71
Eye checked × fair/poor health 0.09 0.75 -0.17 0.72
BP checked × good health 0.39 0.60 0.92 0.72
BP checked × fair/poor health 0.01 0.75 0.55 0.71
Cholesterol checked × good health -0.67 0.63 -1.23 0.77
Cholesterol checked × fair/poor health -0.49 0.75 -0.66 0.74
Continued on next page...
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... table A.2 continued
Good vs. Excellent Poor/Fair vs. Excellent
Variable Name Coefficient SD Coefficient SD
Diet modifications × good health 0.04 0.66 -0.09 0.73
Diet modifications × fair/poor health 0.01 0.72 -0.44 0.73
Exercise × good health -0.33 0.63 -0.20 0.69
Exercise × fair/poor health 0.03 0.72 -0.13 0.70
Diet × exercise -0.15 0.64 -0.03 0.68
Diet × oral meds -0.39 0.63 -0.64 0.67
Exercise × oral meds 0.31 0.56 0.08 0.64
Year 2000 -0.11 0.36 -0.08 0.45
Year 2002 0.09 0.33 0.28 0.40
Year 2003 -0.14 0.48 0.11 0.55
Perm. het. loading, ρ -0.06 0.55 -2.53 0.68
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Table A.3: Estimation Results for Eye Problem
Variable Name Coefficient SD
Constant -17.29 3.94
Health is good 3.57 1.04
Health is poor/fair 0.98 0.98
HBA1c test 2+ -0.53 0.66
HBA1c test 2+ missing -0.92 0.65
Check feet -0.56 0.59
Check feet missing -0.27 0.87
Use oral meds -1.84 0.77
Check eyes -0.49 0.58
Check blood pressure -0.03 0.58
Check blood pressure missing 0.52 0.81
Check cholesterol 0.28 0.72
Check cholesterol missing -1.20 0.93
Modify diet -1.54 0.72
Exercise 3× per week 0.46 0.80
Age 0.42 0.15
Age squared -0.37 0.14
Female 0.10 0.45
No high school degree 0.43 0.46
College degree -1.90 0.80
MS or PhD -1.39 0.87
Other degree -1.14 0.88
Black 0.21 0.67
Family size -0.21 0.09
Urban -0.44 0.46
Married -0.51 0.50
Blood glucose × good health -0.11 0.83
Blood glucose × fair/poor health -0.91 0.77
Feet checked × good health -0.05 0.80
Feet checked × fair/poor health 0.00 0.74
Oral meds × good health -0.51 0.80
Oral meds × fair/poor health -0.24 0.75
Eye checked × good health -0.48 0.81
Eye checked × fair/poor health 0.84 0.74
BP checked × good health -0.15 0.81
BP checked × fair/poor health 0.17 0.76
Cholesterol checked × good health -2.24 0.87
Cholesterol checked × fair/poor health -0.91 0.82
Diet modifications × good health -0.05 0.82
Diet modifications × fair/poor health 0.44 0.76
Exercise × good health 0.15 0.83
Exercise × fair/poor health -0.41 0.84
Continued on next page...
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... table A.3 continued
Variable Name Coefficient SD
Diet × exercise 0.36 0.72
Diet × oral meds 1.47 0.68
Exercise × oral meds -0.97 0.74
Year 2000 0.05 0.52
Year 2002 0.47 0.41
Year 2003 0.39 0.64
Perm. het. loading, ρ -10.85 1.41
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Table A.4: Estimation Results for Kidney Problem
Variable Name Coefficient SD
Constant -8.49 2.79
Health is good 1.09 0.94
Health is poor/fair -0.63 0.87
HBA1c test 2+ -0.75 0.72
HBA1c test 2+ missing -0.39 0.73
Check feet -1.36 0.63
Check feet missing 0.05 0.88
Use oral meds -1.21 0.76
Check eyes 0.06 0.61
Check blood pressure 0.75 0.65
Check blood pressure missing -0.04 0.89
Check cholesterol -0.44 0.77
Check cholesterol missing -1.02 0.98
Modify diet -1.87 0.73
Exercise 3× per week 0.30 0.72
Age 0.14 0.12
Age squared -0.11 0.12
Female -0.31 0.45
No high school degree 0.62 0.55
College degree -0.13 0.74
MS or PhD -1.32 0.89
Other degree -0.38 0.90
Black -0.27 0.73
Family size -0.12 0.10
Urban -0.43 0.51
Married -0.44 0.60
Blood glucose × good health 1.03 0.87
Blood glucose × fair/poor health 0.32 0.79
Feet checked × good health 0.90 0.87
Feet checked × fair/poor health 0.64 0.78
Oral meds × good health -0.32 0.86
Oral meds × fair/poor health 0.20 0.79
Eye checked × good health -1.22 0.82
Eye checked × fair/poor health -0.09 0.73
BP checked × good health -1.14 0.86
BP checked × fair/poor health -0.62 0.79
Cholesterol checked × good health -1.11 0.89
Cholesterol checked × fair/poor health -0.15 0.84
Diet modifications × good health 1.30 0.85
Diet modifications × fair/poor health 1.42 0.77
Exercise × good health -0.98 0.85
Exercise × fair/poor health -0.90 0.80
Continued on next page...
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... table A.4 continued
Variable Name Coefficient SD
Diet × exercise 0.37 0.69
Diet × oral meds 0.09 0.79
Exercise × oral meds 0.50 0.74
Year 2000 -0.03 0.61
Year 2002 -0.05 0.52
Year 2003 -0.05 0.77
Perm. het. loading, ρ -9.46 1.37
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Table A.5: Estimation Results for Insurance
Ins. No Drug vs. Ins. Unins. vs. Ins.
Variable Name Coefficient SD Coefficient SD
Constant -1.42 1.43 -1.43 1.17
Health is good 0.15 0.60 0.13 0.44
Health is poor/fair -0.06 0.64 0.09 0.45
% in PSU insured no drug coverage 5.17 1.20 1.18 1.00
% in PSU uninsured 0.94 0.98 2.39 0.72
Age -0.06 0.10 0.01 0.05
Age squared 0.07 0.11 0.00 0.06
Female 0.08 0.65 -0.10 0.15
No degree -1.20 0.81 0.39 0.18
College degree 0.37 0.75 -0.56 0.64
MS or PhD 0.77 0.79 0.15 0.81
Other degree -1.21 0.87 -0.83 0.82
Black -0.19 0.84 -0.16 0.23
Family size 0.19 0.10 0.16 0.04
Urban 0.04 0.78 -0.66 0.16
Income logged 0.13 0.54 0.16 0.13
Income logged squared -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.01
Married -0.18 0.74 -0.51 0.18
Year 2000 -0.33 0.89 0.16 0.38
Year 2002 -0.35 0.90 -0.04 0.37
Year 2003 -0.24 0.88 0.54 0.51
Perm. het. loading, ρ 0.82 0.88 0.18 0.58
83
Table A.6: Estimation Results for HBA1c Blood Glucose Test
Variable Name Coefficient SD
Constant 2.02 2.45
Health is good 0.20 0.53
Health is poor/fair -0.01 0.59
Insured no drug -0.18 0.79
Uninsured -0.81 0.44
Age -0.03 0.09
Age squared 0.06 0.09
Female 0.16 0.30
No degree -0.07 0.49
College degree -0.05 0.72
MS or PhD 0.06 0.86
Other degree 0.01 0.86
Black 0.29 0.69
Family size -0.14 0.06
Urban -0.29 0.37
Income logged -0.33 0.22
Income logged squared 0.03 0.02
Married -0.04 0.39
Transport to doctor: drives or is driven 0.10 0.84
Transport to doctor: takes taxi or public transport 0.39 0.99
Transportation Missing -0.70 0.67
Distance to doctor: less than 15 minutes 0.03 0.65
Distance to doctor: 15-30 Minutes 0.24 0.80
Travel missing 0.08 0.74
Time trend -5.62 2.78
Time trend squared 2.72 1.30
Time trend cubed -0.38 0.17
Perm. het. loading, ρ -5.92 0.83
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Table A.7: Estimation Results for Feet Checked
Variable Name Coefficient SD
Constant -0.26 1.41
Health is good -0.03 0.35
Health is poor/fair -0.22 0.40
Insured no drug -0.25 0.81
Uninsured -0.35 0.22
Age -0.02 0.07
Age squared 0.03 0.07
Female -0.19 0.19
No degree -0.10 0.26
College degree -0.34 0.65
MS or PhD 0.06 0.82
Other degree 0.39 0.84
Black -0.13 0.25
Family size -0.14 0.05
Urban -0.19 0.22
Income logged -0.22 0.14
Income logged squared 0.02 0.01
Married -0.16 0.23
Transport to doctor: drives or is driven 0.35 0.92
Transport to doctor: takes taxi or public transport -0.51 0.94
Transportation Missing -0.66 0.62
Distance to doctor: less than 15 minutes -0.19 0.49
Distance to doctor: 15-30 Minutes -0.18 0.77
Travel missing -0.52 0.66
Time trend 0.11 1.21
Time trend squared -0.17 0.57
Time trend cubed 0.03 0.08
Perm. het. loading, ρ -4.40 0.71
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Table A.8: Estimation Results for Cholesterol Checked
Variable Name Coefficient SD
Constant -3.21 1.50
Health is good -0.08 0.56
Health is poor/fair -0.33 0.58
Insured no drug 0.68 0.82
Uninsured -0.67 0.33
Age 0.10 0.08
Age squared -0.07 0.09
Female 0.26 0.24
No degree -0.14 0.45
College degree -0.01 0.67
MS or PhD 0.43 0.90
Other degree -0.24 0.83
Black 0.27 0.77
Family size -0.06 0.06
Urban 0.07 0.29
Income logged -0.57 0.21
Income logged squared 0.05 0.02
Married -0.13 0.39
Transport to doctor: drives or is driven 1.04 0.94
Transport to doctor: takes taxi or public transport -0.62 0.92
Transportation Missing -0.66 0.69
Distance to doctor: less than 15 minutes 0.30 0.66
Distance to doctor: 15-30 Minutes 0.20 0.81
Travel missing -0.02 0.70
Time trend 0.77 1.44
Time trend squared -0.42 0.68
Time trend cubed 0.06 0.09
Perm. het. loading, ρ -3.68 0.79
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Table A.9: Estimation Results for Eyes Checked
Variable Name Coefficient SD
Constant -6.40 1.34
Health is good 0.05 0.37
Health is poor/fair -0.43 0.40
Insured no drug 0.08 0.63
Uninsured -0.49 0.16
Age 0.09 0.06
Age squared -0.06 0.06
Female 0.07 0.13
No degree -0.16 0.18
College degree -0.07 0.32
MS or PhD 0.08 0.71
Other degree -0.08 0.71
Black 0.09 0.17
Family size -0.07 0.04
Urban 0.07 0.15
Income logged -0.11 0.12
Income logged squared 0.01 0.01
Married -0.02 0.16
Transport to doctor: drives or is driven 0.11 0.76
Transport to doctor: takes taxi or public transport -0.23 0.98
Transportation Missing 0.08 0.54
Distance to doctor: less than 15 minutes 0.05 0.34
Distance to doctor: 15-30 Minutes 0.19 0.66
Travel missing -0.72 0.58
Time trend 6.36 1.51
Time trend squared -2.82 0.71
Time trend cubed 0.36 0.10
Perm. het. loading, ρ -1.65 0.51
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Table A.10: Estimation Results for BP Checked
Variable Name Coefficient SD
Constant -1.54 1.23
Health is good 0.23 0.33
Health is poor/fair 0.28 0.39
Insured no drug -0.10 0.78
Uninsured -0.53 0.20
Age -0.02 0.06
Age squared 0.04 0.07
Female 0.17 0.15
No degree 0.29 0.24
College degree -0.18 0.62
MS or PhD 0.44 0.81
Other degree 0.04 0.75
Black 0.12 0.22
Family size -0.02 0.04
Urban -0.06 0.19
Income logged -0.03 0.15
Income logged squared 0.01 0.01
Married -0.43 0.22
Transport to doctor: drives or is driven 0.12 0.95
Transport to doctor: takes taxi or public transport -0.23 0.95
Transportation Missing -0.44 0.68
Distance to doctor: less than 15 minutes 0.17 0.44
Distance to doctor: 15-30 Minutes 0.21 0.82
Travel missing -0.29 0.69
Time trend 1.29 1.13
Time trend squared -0.61 0.54
Time trend cubed 0.08 0.07
Perm. het. loading, ρ -2.55 0.71
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Table A.11: Estimation Results for Input Behaviors: Diet
Only vs. None
Variable Name Coefficient SD
Constant -6.98 2.99
Health is good -0.13 0.62
Health is poor/fair -0.00 0.58
Insured no drug -1.34 0.86
Uninsured -0.07 0.51
Age 0.23 0.14
Age squared -0.19 0.15
Female -0.03 0.44
No degree -0.46 0.52
College degree -0.07 0.76
MS or PhD -0.06 0.85
Other degree -0.07 0.87
Black 0.73 0.64
Family size -0.07 0.15
Urban 0.09 0.48
Income logged -0.21 0.41
Income logged squared 0.03 0.03
Married 0.18 0.56
% PSU exercises regularly -0.59 0.92
Year 2000 -0.19 0.57
Year 2002 0.02 0.57
Year 2003 -0.57 0.77
Perm. het. loading, ρ -1.52 0.92
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Table A.12: Estimation Results for Input Behaviors: Exercise
Only vs. None
Variable Name Coefficient SD
Constant -8.67 13.81
Health is good -0.20 0.82
Health is poor/fair -0.84 0.82
Insured no drug -1.16 0.88
Uninsured 0.37 0.78
Age -0.12 0.21
Age squared 0.10 0.24
Female -0.73 0.79
No degree -1.31 0.88
College degree -0.57 0.87
MS or PhD 0.17 0.91
Other degree -0.77 0.97
Black 0.16 0.94
Family size -0.02 0.23
Urban 0.71 0.78
Income logged 1.13 2.62
Income logged squared -0.04 0.13
Married 0.00 0.84
% PSU exercises regularly 6.04 1.07
Year 2000 -0.18 0.86
Year 2002 0.52 0.81
Year 2003 -0.72 0.87
Perm. het. loading, ρ -0.74 1.03
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Table A.13: Estimation Results for Input Behaviors: Oral
Medications Only vs. None
Variable Name Coefficient SD
Constant -11.20 3.22
Health is good 0.23 0.65
Health is poor/fair 0.20 0.61
Insured no drug -1.46 0.88
Uninsured 0.07 0.59
Age 0.34 0.14
Age squared -0.27 0.15
Female -0.29 0.51
No degree -0.15 0.59
College degree -0.33 0.79
MS or PhD -0.03 0.88
Other degree -0.01 0.80
Black 0.89 0.71
Family size 0.05 0.18
Urban 0.80 0.64
Income logged -0.65 0.37
Income logged squared 0.06 0.03
Married -0.19 0.61
% PSU exercises regularly -1.59 0.93
Year 2000 0.32 0.62
Year 2002 0.51 0.61
Year 2003 0.27 0.73
Perm. het. loading, ρ -2.53 1.04
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Table A.14: Estimation Results for Input Behaviors: Diet
and Exericse Only vs. None
Variable Name Coefficient SD
Constant 0.62 2.93
Health is good -0.22 0.56
Health is poor/fair -0.97 0.62
Insured no drug -1.59 0.89
Uninsured -0.31 0.66
Age -0.09 0.14
Age squared 0.11 0.15
Female -0.48 0.45
No degree -0.66 0.70
College degree 0.31 0.67
MS or PhD -0.00 0.81
Other degree -1.54 0.91
Black 0.54 0.82
Family size -0.12 0.19
Urban 0.20 0.52
Income logged -0.28 0.51
Income logged squared 0.03 0.04
Married 0.59 0.65
% PSU exercises regularly 2.03 0.92
Year 2000 0.13 0.59
Year 2002 0.18 0.58
Year 2003 -0.33 0.77
Perm. het. loading, ρ -1.05 0.89
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Table A.15: Estimation Results for Input Behaviors: Diet
and Oral Medications Only vs. None
Variable Name Coefficient SD
Constant -7.25 3.01
Health is good 0.47 0.44
Health is poor/fair -0.17 0.44
Insured no drug -1.49 0.68
Uninsured -0.55 0.38
Age 0.19 0.13
Age squared -0.10 0.14
Female -0.26 0.36
No degree -0.28 0.39
College degree -0.32 0.53
MS or PhD -0.32 0.70
Other degree -0.86 0.70
Black 0.54 0.44
Family size 0.10 0.15
Urban 0.33 0.37
Income logged -0.47 0.31
Income logged squared 0.05 0.02
Married -0.20 0.38
% PSU exercises regularly -1.14 0.75
Year 2000 -0.04 0.43
Year 2002 0.12 0.41
Year 2003 -0.40 0.49
Perm. het. loading, ρ -3.89 0.87
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Table A.16: Estimation Results for Input Behaviors: Exeri-
cise and Oral Medications Only vs. None
Variable Name Coefficient SD
Constant -15.33 4.19
Health is good 0.57 0.70
Health is poor/fair -0.58 0.72
Insured no drug -2.55 1.00
Uninsured 0.12 0.75
Age 0.39 0.18
Age squared -0.31 0.19
Female -0.32 0.73
No degree -0.33 0.85
College degree -0.17 0.86
MS or PhD -0.65 0.99
Other degree 0.13 0.83
Black 0.59 0.81
Family size 0.11 0.20
Urban 0.91 0.81
Income logged -0.58 0.48
Income logged squared 0.05 0.04
Married 0.06 0.86
% PSU exercises regularly 1.79 1.06
Year 2000 -0.01 0.69
Year 2002 0.37 0.65
Year 2003 -0.30 0.77
Perm. het. loading, ρ -3.65 1.09
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Table A.17: Estimation Results for Input Behaviors: Diet,
Exericise and Oral Medications vs. None
Variable Name Coefficient SD
Constant -6.69 3.00
Health is good 0.22 0.43
Health is poor/fair -1.16 0.46
Insured no drug -1.66 0.75
Uninsured -0.41 0.39
Age 0.12 0.13
Age squared -0.04 0.14
Female -0.51 0.36
No degree -0.28 0.40
College degree -0.22 0.53
MS or PhD 0.32 0.68
Other degree -0.65 0.71
Black 0.47 0.45
Family size 0.17 0.15
Urban 0.44 0.38
Income logged -0.29 0.32
Income logged squared 0.03 0.02
Married -0.21 0.39
% PSU exercises regularly 1.65 0.80
Year 2000 -0.22 0.45
Year 2002 -0.05 0.43
Year 2003 -0.35 0.53
Perm. het. loading, ρ -3.79 0.92
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